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INTRODUCTION
There is a crisis in the public pension systems of several states. With tril-
lions of dollars at stake, practitioners, policymakers, and academics alike are ur-
gently addressing the pension problem. Politicians in nearly every state have
been considering a variety of proposals and implementing changes that affect
millions of government workers and retirees.' Courts have also entered the mi-
lieu as impacted employees test whether reforms surmount legal obstacles and
pass constitutional muster.' Members of Congress have even attempted to facil-
itate a solution to the state pension debt crisis due to its negative impact on the
American economy.3
In this Article, we integrate and extend the pension reform movements in
law, education, and economics by studying teacher pensions across the United
1. NASRA Issue Brief. State and Local Government Spending on Public Employee Re-
tirement Systems, NAT'L Ass'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS. I (May, 2014), http://
www.nasra.org/files/Issue%2oBriefs/NASRACostsBrief.pdf ("In the wake of the
2008-09 market decline, nearly every state and many cities have taken steps to im-
prove the financial condition of their retirement plans and to reduce costs.").
2. See discussion infra Part II.B.
3. On July 9, 2013, U.S. Senator and Finance Committee Ranking Member Orrin
Hatch introduced the Secure Annuities for Employee (SAFE) Retirement Act of
2013 to strengthen and reform much of the nation's public and private pension
benefit system. See Hatch Unveils Bill to Overhaul Pension Benefit System, Secure
Retirement Savings, ORRIN HATCH (July 9, 2013), http://www.hatch.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/releases?ID=bb7de6e5-a45f-4851-bl7e-2c9c6dce972b; see also
Julia Lawless & Antonia Ferrier, Hatch Releases Report Detailing Threat of $4.4
Trillion Public Pension Debt, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN. (Jan. io, 2012),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?idf9a92142-di9o
-4bca-a31o-b43cb462eb45 (discussing report released by Senator Orrin Hatch ana-
lyzing "how the unfunded pension liabilities of state and local governments jeop-
ardize the fiscal solvency of states and municipalities as well as the nation's long-
term fiscal health, including the U.S. credit rating").
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States. Our interdisciplinary approach concentrates on an overlooked and vul-
nerable group of government workers-those who have defined benefit plans
and do not contribute to Social Security. The federal government does not
oversee these plans, and there are no insurance programs if the plans fail.
Through our quantitative and qualitative analysis, we aim to improve theory
and practice by providing a valuable perspective as states reconsider their pen-
sion obligations.
Part I appraises the problem and establishes that the retirement income se-
curity of public employees is in jeopardy. More specifically, it analyzes the pen-
sions of teachers who contribute to defined benefit plans, collectively more than
thirty billion dollars annually, and not to Social Security. 4 These plans are in
pension systems that span thirteen states and comprise more than three million
members.5 Our financial calculations show serious underfunding of educator
defined benefit plans since the global financial crisis. A statistical analysis com-
paring plans that do and do not fund Social Security also demonstrates that the
latter pensions are, in fact, most at risk of failure.
Part II surveys the recent reforms of public pensions as well as the legal ob-
stacles to these legislative solutions. Given our concern with teacher pensions in
non-Social Security states, we highlight the following jurisdictions: Alaska, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas. Significantly, pension reform raises
new constitutional questions that challenge courts to craft a conceptual frame-
work for consistent interpretation and application. We assess and summarize
decisions on public pension changes involving the Due Process Clause, Takings
Clause, and Contract Clause, and we find that the Contract Clause is the most
significant legal barrier to reform.
Part III focuses on fixing teacher pensions. Our recommendations take into
account the dire financial condition of educator defined benefit plans and the
experience with existing reforms along with their ongoing constitutional chal-
lenges. Due to the diversity in law and legislation among states, we do not urge
a uniform answer to the pension problem, but provide options and a decision-
making framework for political action. The multi-dimensional model directs
attention to potential reforms to the pension contract ex ante and ex post. It al-
so addresses key actors in the provision of public retirement benefits: politicians
and unions. It further aims to involve the public, who will ultimately bear the
financial and social burdens associated with public plans, by increasing the ac-
curacy and transparency of pension promises.
The Article concludes that a comprehensive response to teacher pensions is
necessary to avert disaster. Part of that response includes the addition of Social
Security or a state insurance program for pension plan failure. The defined ben-
4. NAT'L ASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., supra note 1, at 2 (noting that forty percent
of public school teachers do not contribute to Social Security, which is thirty per-
cent of state and local employees overall, amounting to $31.2 billion annually that
would have been paid to Social Security).
5. See discussion infra Part I; infra Table 2.
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efit plans of public school teachers have unfunded liabilities of almost one tril-
lion dollars, part of a national gap in public plans which exceeds three trillion
dollars.' As a result, our analysis of public pension reform has far-reaching im-
plications for the present financial security of teachers and the future of educa-
tion,7 and informs an ongoing debate that has made the headlines of every ma-
jor newspaper in the country.
6. Estimates for educator plans range from $332 billion to $933 billion. See Josh Bar-
ro & Stuart Buck, Underfunded Teacher Pension Plans: It's Worse than You Think,
MANHATTAN INST. REP. FOR POL. RES. (Apr. 2010), http://www.manhattan
-institute.org/html/cr_- 61.htm. For studies that calculate three trillion dollars in
unfunded liabilities for public plans, see Eileen Norcross & Andrew Biggs, The
Crisis in Public Sector Pension Plans: A Blueprint for Reform in New Jersey i (Mer-
catus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 1O-31, 2010), http://mercatus
.org/sites/default/files/publication/WPo31%2oNJ%2oPensions.pdf and Report of
the State Budget Crisis Task Force, ST. BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE 34-35 (July 31,
2012), http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the
-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force- Full.pdf.
7. A recent report by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College conclud-
ed that pension cuts "will almost certainly result in a lower quality of applicants
for one of the nation's most important jobs." Alicia H. Munnell & Rebecca Can-
non Fraenkel, Compensation Matters: The Case of Teachers, CENTER FOR
RETIREMENT RES., BOS. C. (Jan. 2013), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2o13/
o1/slp28_5o8rev.pdf; see also Eric A. Hanuschek, The Economic Value of Higher
Teacher Quality 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16606,
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w66o6 (commenting that a widely accepted
policy proposal for hiring better teachers is to provide more financial incentives);
Robert M. Costrell & Michael Podgursky, Teacher Pension Costs: High, Rising, and
Out of Control, EDUC. NEXT (June 25, 2013), http://educationnext.org/teacher
-pension-costs-high-rising-and-out-of-control (concluding that the high costs of
teacher defined benefit plans are real and are "crowding out other school spend-
ing and are leading to layoffs of young teachers"). Teacher quality has been linked
to advances in student education. See, e.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Educating
Teachers: The Academy's Greatest Failure or Its Most Important Future?, 85
ACADEME 26, 29 (1999) (commenting that the ability of teachers is one of the most
powerful determinants of student achievement and is more influential than pov-
erty, race, or the educational attainment of parents).
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1. MEASURING THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: A STUDY OF
EDUCATOR DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
Widespread media attention to recent studies has exposed enormous un-
funded liability in public pension plans.8 Such liability is defined as the future
benefits to be paid for which sufficient funds have not been accumulated. De-
pending on the assumed discount rate and other variables, state pensions are
collectively somewhere between $700 billion and $4.6 trillion short of the fund-
ing needed to meet their actuarial liabilities.9 For public school teachers, one
study found that unfunded obligations amounted to $933 billion.' ° In this sec-
tion, we add to these financial analyses by examining educator defined benefit
plans and providing statistical analysis of these public plans and the factors that
explain their problems."
8. See The Widening Gap Update, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Retirement
_security/Widening% 2oGap%2oBrief% /2oUpdate.webREV.pdf; cf Eduard Ponds
et al., Funding in Public Sector Pension Plans-International Evidence 32 fig.6 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17082, 2011), http://www
.nber.org/papers/wl7o82.pdf (examining underfunded public employee pension
plans in other countries).
9. Assuming that investments will appreciate at about eight percent per year indefi-
nitely, the 2011 Pew Report estimated $70o billion in unfunded liabilities. The
Widening Gap: The Great Recession's Impact on State Pension and Retiree Health
Care Costs, PEW CHARITABLE TR., (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/reports/aooi/oi/ol/the-widening-gap; see also Dean Baker,
The Origins and Severity of the Public Pension Crisis, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL'Y
RES. 10 (2011), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/pension-2o11-02.pdf
(estimating a shortfall at $647 billion using more favorable rates of return for pen-
sion fund assets). But the unfunded liabilities rise to $1.8 trillion using assump-
tions similar to corporate pensions or $2.4 trillion using a discount rate based on a
thirty-year Treasury bond. See Andrew G. Biggs, Public Sector Pensions: How Well
Funded Are They, Really?, ST. BUDGET SOLUTIONS iii (July 2012), http://www
.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/2o120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf (finding
total unfunded liabilities of approximately $4.6 trillion as of 2011); PEW
CHARITABLE TR., supra note 8. Other studies put the figure around three trillion
dollars or more. See Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force, supra note 6, at
34-35 (estimating three trillion dollars of underfunding by using a lower discount
rate than the eight percent rate of return commonly used by pension plans).
io. See Barro & Buck, supra note 6 (calculating a $933 billion shortfall in teacher pen-
sion funding, but noting that a previous study estimated only $332 billion).
11. Our calculations ignore other post-retirement employee benefits, including state-
provided employee health care. See The Trillion Dollar Gap: Underfunded State Re-
tirement Systems and the Road to Reform, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2010/02/lo/the
-trillion-dollar-gap (reporting that these additional costs total $587 billion in pre-
sent value). We also focus on state pensions, not local city and county plans. See
Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and
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Defined benefit plans are the primary kind of pension offered to public
employees.'" Under a defined benefit plan, the government has the obligation to
provide retirement income to its employees for the duration of their lives and
potentially the lives of their spouses. 3 As such, unlike other pension plans
where employees bear the investment risk themselves, defined benefit plans
cause employees to rely on employers for their retirement income.' 4 In theory,
the promise of a pension benefit creates a concomitant duty on the part of the
state.'5 In reality, however, employees bear the risk that state governments will
fail to provide such benefits.'6 Because of legal impediments to cutting accrued
pension benefits, taxpayers will share the burden of plan insolvency when states
raise taxes to cover pensions.' 7
We analyze seven years of data (2003-2009) provided by the Boston College
Center for Retirement Research. Data collection ends in 2009 because that is the
last year that complete data are available.'8 We examine a total of fifty public
What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1215 (2011) (estimating these plans hold $560
billion in assets).
12. See generally JULIA K. BONAFEDE ET AL., 2005 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION 4 (2005). Ninety
percent of public employee plans are defined benefit plans. Gordon Tiffany, Pub-
lic Employee Retirement Planning, 28 EMP. BENEFITS J. 3, 7 (2003). These plans de-
fine retirement benefits upon employment and are financed in part by employees'
fixed contributions.
13. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 454
(2004).
14. Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform is
Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 307, 310-11 (2007); see also id. at 312 (explaining that defined benefit
plans specify an output while defined contribution plans specify an input). For
different types of pension plans and their characteristics, see discussion infra Part
III.B.
15. See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE
PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS (2012).
16. EVERETT T. ALLEN ET AL., PENSION PLANNING: PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND
OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 401-02 (9th ed. 2003) (discussing the
"funding risk"); Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 313-14.
17. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
18. While there have been some changes in return results and asset allocation for
these plans, they reflect the fact that reported data are smoothed over a three-to-
four year period to more accurately portray long-term results. It takes a long peri-
od of time for significant changes to appear in the data where the changes are in
return or mandated by legislatures. If anything, the new changes required by the
Governmental Accounting Standard Board (GASB) in 2012 make the data appear
worse in terms of the employer contributions. The GASB sets the reporting stand-
ards for public pension accounting. The changes require states to lower the dis-
count rate. See Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions, GOVERNMENTAL
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teacher pensions, comparing the thirteen plans that do not fund Social Security
with the thirty-seven plans that do.'9 We hypothesized that non-Social Security
states would be in better financial condition due to larger contributions from
both employers and employees because they do not have to contribute funds to
Social Security. Pension health is critical for participants in these state plans be-
cause they are unable to collect Social Security unless they have significant earn-
ings outside of their primary employment. Therefore, if the pension plan can-
not make the promised payments, retirement income is not protected by the
federal program. Our analysis is noteworthy not only because of the significance
of our results relating to pension health, but also because there has been no
study of public pensions focused on non-Social Security states.
Contrary to our hypothesis, overall, the data analysis exposes a greater risk
for non-Social Security states of not being able to meet benefit payments to re-
tirees.2" The results are confirmed with an OLS regression. This statistical meth-
od allows a comparison of all the factors that impact the differences between
non-Social Security plans and those plans that also invest in Social Security.
ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http:/lwww.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage
&cid=1176163527868 (explaining GASB Statement No. 68); Financial Reporting for
Pension Plans, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, http://www.gasb.org/
jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=n7616352783o (explaining GASB State-
ment No. 67). Changing the discount rate increases the liabilities of the pension
plans.
19. State governments were not able to include employees with pensions in the Social
Security System until the middle of the twentieth century. Originally, the Social
Security Act of 1935 excluded state and local employees from coverage. Judith S.
Lohman, Teachers and Social Security, OLR RES. REP. (Sept. 7, 20o6), http://
www.cga.ct.gov/2oo6/rpt/2oo6-R-0547.htm (advising that limited coverage was
due to "constitutional concerns over whether the federal government could im-
pose taxes on state governments"). Given its limited inclusion, numerous
amendments were added throughout the years to expand the coverage. H.R. Res.
7225, 84th Cong. (1956) (enacted) (offering a Disability Insurance Program); H.R.
Res. 6635, 76th Cong. (1939) (enacted) (adding child, spouse, and survivor benefits
to wives and widows over age sixty-five and children under eighteen). Not until
1951 were states able to extend Social Security coverage to employees that were al-
ready covered under a public retirement system. 42 U.S.C § 418 (2012) (allowing
coverage of all state employees except for police and firefighters covered under a
public retirement system); see also Social Security Act Amendments of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-432, lO8 Stat. 4398 (extending coverage to police officers and firefight-
ers). In 1991, Congress amended the law to provide that most state and local gov-
ernment employees are subject to mandatory Social Security coverage unless they
are part of an alternative pension plan. Dawn Nuschler, et al., Social Security:
Mandatory Coverage of New State and Local Government Employees, CONG. RES.
SERVICE 3 (July 25, 2011), http://www.nasra.org/Files/Topical/2oReports/Social
O/o2Security/CRS%202011%2oReport.pdf.
20. To reiterate, the results have not changed significantly due to the changes made by
the public pension plan accounting regulatory body. If anything, the changes
make the numbers look worse in terms of employer contributions.
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These factors include the number of teachers and their average salaries, asset
allocation, investment return, plan membership, contribution rates, actuarial
accrued liability, and the log of the population for each state. Data used in the
OLS regression and results are shown in the Appendix in Tables 1-6.
The descriptive statistics reported in Tables 1-4 show the average differences
between non-Social Security pension plans and Social Security pension plans
for public school teachers who participate in defined benefit plans. Tables 5 and
6 show the results of OLS regressions that determine which variables, if any, are
statistically significant when the dependent variable is the unfunded actuarial
accrued liability (Uaal). The Uaal is the difference between the actuarial accrued
liability and actuarial assets.
There are ten independent variables. The first independent variable is the
mean number of active teachers (Teachers)1 The mean and standard deviation
are much higher for non-Social Security states than for Social Security states."
The non-Social Security states have both very large teacher populations (Cali-
fornia and Texas) and very small teacher populations (Alaska) among the thir-
teen states.
The second independent variable is the mean salary (Salary)." The mean
salary is smaller for non-Social Security states but has a larger standard devia-
tion±4 The third independent variable is the employee contribution rate (Em-
ployee Contr. Rates). The contribution rate is the percentage of salary that is
contributed to the pension plan by the employee. Employees in non-Social Se-
curity states have a higher mean contribution percentage than Social Security
states, reflecting the fact that they do not contribute to Social Security. 6 The
employer contribution rate (Employer Rates) is the fourth independent varia-
ble.27 It is the percentage of the employee salary that the employer contributes
to the pension plan. The rate is higher in non-Social Security states than Social
Security states.'
The fifth independent variable is the mean percentage of equities (Equities)
in the pension plan portfolio. 9 Equities include both United States and foreign
stocks, with both Social Security and non-Social Security states having a higher
percentage in United States stocks.3" Non-Social Security states have a higher
21. See infra Table 5.
22. See infra Table 5.
23. See infra Table 5.
24. See infra Table 5.
25. See infra Table 5.
26. See infra Table 3.
27. See infra Table 5.
28. See infra Table 3.
29. See infra Table 5.
30. See infra Table 1.
33 :1 2014
REFORMING PUBLIC PENSIONS
percentage of equities but a lower standard deviation, indicating that the per-
centage of equity holdings is more homogenous on average in these states."
Bonds (Bonds) are the sixth independent variable and consist of the mean per-
centage of both United States and foreign bonds in the pension plan portfolio.32
As with equities, non-Social Security states have a higher percentage of bonds
with a smaller standard deviation.33
The seventh independent variable is the mean one-year investment return
(One-Year Return). 34 It is the one-year return on the total portfolio of all pen-
sion investments for the states in each type of pension plan.3 5 Non-Social Secu-
rity states have a lower return and standard deviation.36 The eighth independent
variable is the mean actuarial accrued liability (Actuarial Liability),3 7 which is
the present value of future benefits earned for accrued service. The mean dollar
number is smaller for non-Social Security states.3
The ninth independent variable is the total number of all members (Mem-
bers), shown by type of pension plan.3 9 Non-Social Security states have fewer
members and a smaller standard deviation.4° The tenth and last independent
variable is the log of the mean population (LogPopulation) by type of pension
plan. 4' The log of the number is used because otherwise this variable would
overwhelm all of the other variables.
We run OLS regressions with the data because it is an efficient model to test
which of the variables, if any, have a strong relationship with the Uaal. The
model allows us to look at all of the variables at one time rather than testing one
variable at a time. This type of statistical model focuses on the conditional
probability distribution of the dependent variable (Y), given (X), the multiple
independent variables. In other words, the OLS regression has the ability to
show how strong a relationship there is between Uaal and each of the inde-
pendent variables. If there is a significant relationship, the results will be
marked at the .05 or .oi level of significance. A variable significant at the .05 lev-
el indicates that if there is in fact no relationship between the variables, we
would expect to get our results only five times out of one hundred. Significance
31. See infra Table 5.
32. See infra Table 5.
33. See infra Table 5.
34. See infra Table 5.
35. See infra Table 5.
36. See infra Table 5.
37. See infra Table 5.
38. See infra Table 5.
39. See infra Table 2.
40. See infra Table 5.
41. See infra Table 5.
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at the .oi level indicates that we would get our results only one time out of one
hundred if there is in fact no relationship between the variables.
Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of all the variables in the
regression for all fifty states, and for the non-Social Security states and Social
Security states separately. Table 6 provides the results of the OLS regression.
The OLS regression for all states is of primary interest because it allows us
to determine if there is a significant difference in Uaal between Social Security
states and non-Social Security states. We see this by looking at the dummy vari-
able representing membership in a non-Social Security state. A dummy variable
in a regression is used to distinguish between two subgroups of data. One sub-
group is given a value of zero (Social Security state) and the other subgroup is
given a value of one (non-Social Security state) to indicate the absence or pres-
ence of the variable that may shift the results of the regression.
At the .oi level of significance, there is a statistical difference between the
Uaal for the two types of state pension plans based on the dummy variable.
Thus, there is a statistically significant difference between non-Social Security
states and Social Security states in their level of unfunded actuarial accrued lia-
bility. This means that if the state is non-Social Security, it is more likely to have
Uaal.
What can be said about the regression results for all states? Of the ten inde-
pendent variables, seven of them have a statistically significant relationship to
the dependent variable Uaal. If the pension plan has more teachers and a higher
projected benefit obligation, then its Uaal will be larger. If the pension plan has
lower salaries, fewer equities and bonds in its investment portfolio, fewer mem-
bers, and a smaller population, then it will have a higher Uaal.
Another way of thinking about the results is that the Uaal is the difference
between what the actuary estimates to be the accrued liability (what is owed to
the members of the pension plans) and what the actuary estimates the asset val-
ue to be in the investment portfolio. If it is a positive difference, then more is
owed than has been set aside to pay the members in retirement. Given that con-
tribution rates and one-year returns are not statistically significant, these varia-
bles are not strongly related to this actuarially determined difference. The varia-
bles outlined above that are statistically significant have a stronger relationship.
In sum, the market crash wiped out billions for already underfunded public
pension plans. Our financial evaluation makes clear that plans in non-Social Se-
curity states have not been spared and, in fact, are more underfunded than in
Social Security states. Each state must examine on an individual basis how the
factors in our regression impact Uaal and, accordingly, affect its plan.
Our assessment of the effect of ongoing economic forces is even more dra-
matic when considered together with demographic forces reshaping retirement
income security. Pension receipt among retirees is expected to continue to grow
as aging baby boomers, who account for a disproportionate share of the popu-
lation, retire sooner and live longer than previous generations. 42 Therefore, the
42. In almost forty years, retirement age has fallen dramatically. See Patrick Purcell,
Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends, 2000 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 19,
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unsustainability of these plans, whose membership includes roughly one-
quarter of all public employees, 43 should be of great interest to lawmakers and
the public at large who must eventually foot the bill. It is assuredly of great con-
cern to the participants themselves.
The gravity of the current crisis has pushed pension reform for teachers and
other government workers to the front of the public policy agenda in each state
capital. 44 To gain a better understanding of how to manage what analysts are
calling the public pension "bomb,"45 the next Part surveys pension reform and
its potential legal constraints. To reiterate, surveying recent changes to pension
plans in non-Social Security states is important given our results showing their
weakened financial condition in comparison to those in Social Security states.
But participants will likely have constitutional protections from reforms that
reduce their benefits. Understanding what measures are available to fix these
failing retirement systems is largely a function of the complex legal environ-
ment in which they operate.
II. REVIEWING REFORMS AND THEIR LEGAL OBSTACLES: STATE SURVEY OF
PUBLIC PENSION LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION
Pension reform has taken center stage in the public policy debate as states
struggle to deal with the fallout from the Great Recession. Given the alarming
actuarial deficits, government officials in almost every state have enacted reform
legislation. 46 Unfortunately, most measures address only part of the problem,
21 tbl.2 (showing about one-half of males aged sixty-five or over were in the labor
force in 1950 compared with less than one-fifth by 199o).
43. Jack M. Beermann, Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 20 (2013) (not-
ing that about one in four public employees does not contribute to the Social Se-
curity System).
44. Many newly-elected governors and legislators have promised to focus on improv-
ing public pensions. See Roads to Reform: Changes to Public Sector Retirement Ben-
efits Across States, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 11 2010), http://www.pewirusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/reports/2olo/ni/n/roads-to-reform-changes-to-public
-sector- retirement-benefits-across-states.
45. Given the data, the ticking time bomb seems an apt analogy. See Katie Benner,
The Public Pension Bomb, FORTUNE (May 12, 2009), http://archive.fortune
.com/2009/05/12/news/economy/bennerpension.fortune/index.htm ("[S] tates
nationwide have shortchanged the retirement programs....").
46. See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension
Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263, 299 (2011) (stating that state governors
rolled back pensions to respond to the budget crisis); Michael Corkery, Pension
Crisis Looms Despite Cuts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
articles/SBloooo87239639o44389o3o4578oo752828 9 3 5688 (noting that forty-five
states since 20o9 have cut pension benefits); see also Edward J. Zychowicz, A Glob-
al Look at the Reform of Public Pension Systems, 2 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 49 (2003)
(providing an international comparison of public pension reform).
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falling short of an optimal solution.47 Moreover, many states are facing lawsuits
challenging these new statutes that may ultimately stymie reform measures.0
With a view toward guiding future legislative correctives, this Part reviews re-
cent reforms in non-Social Security states and analyzes their likely legal obsta-
cles.
A. Political Reform Measures
The recession is putting tremendous pressure on public pensions and the
state governments that fund them. Even with an optimistic rate of return on
pension fund investments, projections estimate that plans in seven states will be
insolvent by 202o and plans in half the states will be broke by 2o27.49 The pen-
sion funds in two non-Social Security states, Colorado and Illinois, could de-
fault in the next decade unless drastic measures are taken." The financial situa-
tion in these two states, along with California, led one analyst to conclude that
"bankruptcy or the complete cessation of all state functions save paying benefits
to retirees is not unthinkable."" Other states are also in an emergency scenario
where paying down the pension debt will curtail public services, such as money
for schools. 52 With the desire for public employees to have adequate retirement
benefits both now and in the future, elected officials in several states have enact-
ed a variety of reform measures. These changes apply to all members of public
pensions, including educators.
State legislators have focused on the following measures to help their pen-
sion funds: employee contributions, employer contributions, cost of living ad-
justments (COLAs), age and service requirements, and calculation of benefits.
Since 2011 all non-Social Security states except Nevada enacted reform legisla-
47. See, e.g., Christopher D. Hu, Note, Reforming Public Pensions in Rhode Island, 23
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 523, 530-33 (2012).
48. Stuart Buck, Legal Obstacles to State Pension Reform, http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1917563 (commenting on litigation in nine states).
49. See American States' Pension Funds: A Gold Plated Burden, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14,
2010, at ii, http://www.economist.com/node/17248984; Josh Rauh, The Day of
Reckoning for State Pension Plans, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://
kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/201o/o3/22/the-day-of-reckoning-for-state-pension
-plans (illustrating the ten states whose funds are expected to become insolvent
the soonest and the ten expected to become insolvent the latest); see also Norcross
& Biggs, supra note 6, at 2 (citations omitted) (reporting that state actuaries esti-
mate that New Jersey's pension plans could run out of assets to make benefit
payments as early as 2013).
50. American States' Pension Funds: A Gold Plated Burden, supra note 49.
51. Maria O'Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Pub-
lic Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 434 (2012).




tion.53 Several altered their contribution rates in the past few years to combat
funding issues.5 4 Others increased employee contributions. 5 Meanwhile, one
state decreased its employee contributions for new hires." Increasing the con-
tribution rate for employees, employers, or both, should increase the funds
available to invest in the existing portfolio of assets. Additional funds add to the
dollar amount of assets and, ideally, the investment income which may decrease
the unfunded pension liability. Decreasing the employee or employer contribu-
tion rate must be balanced by increasing the employer or employee contribu-
tion rate, respectively, or increasing the investment income of the portfolio.
Otherwise the unfunded pension liability will increase.
Another typical reform was altering the COLA, which is an adjustment
made to pension benefit payouts in order to counteract the effects of inflation.57
Nine states have changed their plans' COLAs, some affecting existing employees
and retirees. 5s COLA increases allow retirees to offset some of the impact of in-
flation on their income. COLA increases, however, occur the year after the in-
flation has taken place. This means that even when there is a COLA adjustment,
retirees' income losses have already occurred and are only partially compen-
sated. By eliminating the COLA or making it dependent on the inflation rate,
the costs of retirement benefits over time are significantly reduced.
A common change has also been to increase age and service requirements.
Many non-Social Security states have modified these requirements. 59 Increasing
the retirement age allows for a longer accumulation period for each individual.
This means that there are more contributions from both employees and em-
ployers and, hopefully, greater investment income to support the future bene-
fits to be paid. Keeping members active longer also reduces the number of retir-
ees and the length of time that they can collect benefits. Increasing service
requirements for retirement eligibility achieves the same ends as increasing the
53. Ronald K. Snell, Pensions and Retirement Plan Enactments in 2011 State Legisla-
tures, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/employ/2olEnactmentsFinalReport.pdf (surveying 2011 pension re-
forms). States with pension plans that do and do not fund Social Security have
enacted similar reforms. See PEW CHARITABLE TR., supra note 44; NAT'L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/pension-legislation
-database.aspx (providing searchable database for state pension legislation from
2012 through April 8, 2014).




58. See Alicia H. Munnell et al., COLA Cuts in State/Local Pensions, CENTER FOR
RETIREMENT RES., Bos. C. (May 2014), http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/cola-cuts-in-
statelocal-pensions; NAT'LASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADM INS., supra note i, at i.
59. See Snell, supra note 53.
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retirement age. In many plans, both age and service requirements have been in-
creased.
Furthermore, six states have made changes to the calculation of retirement
benefits.6" These changes normally involve decreasing the benefit factor and in-
creasing the number of years used to calculate the final average compensation.6"
The general formula for most plans at retirement entitles an employee to an an-
nual benefit equal to a percentage of the employee's final average salary, multi-
plied by the number of years of employment.62 The reduction in the benefit fac-
tor and the increase in the number of years required for retirement results in
future retirees having lower benefits in retirement for a shorter period of time.
Lower benefits should reduce unfunded liability, but it would take many years
for this to have a significant impact on a pension plan. A shorter period of time
in retirement should also reduce the cost of future benefits, depending on the
longevity of retirees.
In light of the foregoing, legislatures have been making changes to their re-
tirement plans to combat concerns about their continued viability. Presumably
to avoid the high costs of lawsuits, states have been careful to limit reforms
(other than COLA changes) to new hires. 63 But certain states like Colorado,
Maine, and Ohio, unable to finance their pension obligations, have gone further
and have extended reforms to current employees and retirees. 64 The next sec-
tion analyzes challenges to legal changes in Colorado and other states, which




62. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 687-91
(2000). The final-pay provision may base benefits on earnings averaged, for ex-
ample, over the highest three years of employment. See id. at 689. Teachers typi-
cally accrue benefits after thirty years of service and receive 57.7% of the final aver-
age salary, while public safety workers generally receive 66.6% of the final average
salary. See Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,
in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 11, 15 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead
eds., 2001). Another common method is the career-pay provision that bases bene-
fits on earnings averaged over the entire career of employment. For an explana-
tion of the various types of defined benefit formulas used in calculating plan
benefits, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 16, at 229-34.
63. See Snell, supra note 53, at 8.
64. States whose employees receive Social Security have also cut benefits to retirees.
See Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise Isn't a Promise: Public Employers' Ability
to Alter Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2011) (not-
ing that Colorado, Minnesota, South Dakota, and New Jersey have passed pension
reforms that reduced the amount of benefits to already-retired public employees).
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B. Legal Barriers to Reform
This section explains the next phase of public pension reform-related con-
troversies: litigation. Legislative interference with pension rights raises state and
federal constitutional concerns.6" Specifically, government alteration of the de-
fined benefit plan or its basic features could potentially violate the state and fed-
eral due process clauses, takings clauses, and contract clauses.66 Legal protection
extends only to existing employees and retirees, not new hires.
The traditional view of public pensions sees them as gratuities granted by
the state that can be modified or abolished even after retirement.67 Texas courts
still consider pensions as gratuities.68 As far as the Constitution is concerned,
65. For earlier litigation over public pensions, see David L. Gregory, The Problematic
Status of Employee Compensation and Retiree Pension Security: Resisting the State,
Reforming the Corporation, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 37 (1995) (discussing litigation in
New York, Oregon, Maine, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit).
66. Reforms that disadvantage certain workers more than others may also be chal-
lenged under the equal protection clause. Similar to the due process clause, al-
leged equal protection violations are subject to a rational basis review. As a result,
pension reform will not be voided on equal protection grounds so long as the
statutory classification has some relation to the purpose of the retirement system.
Because many statutes set apart retirees as the class that the retirement system is
chiefly designed to benefit, it follows that non-retirees will not be entitled to the
same treatment under the law. For instance, in State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teach-
ers Retirement Board, legislation targeting non-retirees survived an equal protec-
tion challenge. 697 N.E.zd 644 (Ohio 1998). The Supreme Court of Ohio declared
there was no disparate treatment between public school teachers who met retire-
ment eligibility and those who did not. Id. at 652-53. Independent of these consti-
tutional rights provisions, certain states also have constitutional provisions relat-
ing to their public retirement systems. These provisions may be an independent
source of legislative limitation on unilateral modifications. See Smith v. Bd. of Trs.
of La. State Emps.' Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 111o, 11o8 (La. 2003).
67. See Dodge v. Bd. of Educ. Chi., 302 U.S. 74, 81 (1937) (ruling that a new statute re-
ducing payments under a prior statute to those already receiving their pensions
did not violate the contract clause); Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 470-72 (1889)
(deducting funds from employees' paychecks for other purposes did not violate
beneficiaries' due process rights because pensions are gratuities that could be
withdrawn at any time).
68. See Kunin v. Feofanov, 69 F.3d 59, 63 (sth Cir. 1995) (applying Texas law); City of
Dall. v. Trammel, iOi S.W.2d lOO9, 1017 (Tex. 1937). Pensions are deemed gratui-
ties only with respect to compulsory plans. See Amy Monahan, Public Pension
Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDuc. FIN. & POL'Y 617, 621 (201o) (noting
that only compulsory plans in Texas and Indiana have no legal protection for ad-
verse plan changes). Optional plans have protection in Indiana. Id.; see also Kraus
v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (III. App. Ct. 1979)
(explaining that optional retirement plans in Illinois had protection from the time
employees began contributing to the pension fund). Indiana and possibly Arkan-
sas may also follow the gratuity approach with respect to involuntary plans. See
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lawmakers in states that have adopted the gratuity approach have the most
freedom to fix pension problems.6 9 They may be constrained by moral and pol-
icy concerns, but not the law.7
°
An overwhelming majority of states, however, have transformed tradition
and retreated from the notion of pensions as unprotected gratuities and adopt-
ed a modern view that is more protective of the retirement security of public
employees. 71 Change has come by both judicial interpretation and legislative en-
actment.72 The modern view postulates that it is possible for government work-
ers to have a protectable interest in their pensions. 73 We use the term "view"
Robinson v. Taylor, 29 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Ark. 2000); Eric M. Madiar, Public Pen-
sion Benefits Under Siege: Does State Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the
Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 185 (2012) (list-
ing Texas, Indiana, and Arkansas as states utilizing the gratuity approach).
69. As discussed infra in Part III.A.2, however, there may be additional protections for
pension benefits: public employee political power may also pose a significant im-
pediment to change.
70. See Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 303 N.E.2d 320, 325 (Mass.
1973) (allowing the legislature to cut retirees' pensions to the extent they accepted
earnings from outside employment after their retirement); McCarthy v. State Bd.
of Ret., 331 Mass. 46, 46-47 (1954) (holding that it did not matter that the member
was actually receiving his retirement benefits when the statute was passed denying
him creditable service for his period in the General Court); Trammel, 1o S.W.2d
at 1OO9-1lO, 1017 (upholding a law that cut monthly pension payments to a retir-
ee by more than half because the retiree did not have a vested right to participate
in the fund).
71. For the evolution from pensions as gratuities to protectable interests, see, for ex-
ample, Kraus, 39o N.E.2d at 1285, in which the gratuity approach changed under
the state constitution; and Horvath, 697 N.E.2d at 652, in which the gratuity ap-
proach changed by state statute. The gratuity approach turned into the opposite
and equally inflexible absolute vesting approach. Dullea v. Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 421 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). From these all-or-nothing ap-
proaches to pension protection emerged the concept of limited vesting. Id.
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. For early literature discussing the transi-
tion from the gratuity to the contract approach, see generally Note, Public Em-
ployee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L. REV. 992, 994-1003 (1977);
Note, Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan Modification, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 251, 255-
63 (1956).
73. For different approaches to public pension protection mentioned by courts, see,
for example, Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 8o8 (Conn. 1985), which describes
two limited vesting views and an estoppel approach. For various categories of
pension rights conceived by legal scholars, see, for example, Jeffrey B. Ellman &
Daniel J. Merrett, Pension and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to
Solve Their Pension Woes, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365 (2011), which describes
multiple modern views including the vested-rights doctrine, the California Rule,
the Pennsylvania Rule, contract-theory, and the property interest approach; and
Monahan, supra note 68, at 624-28, which suggests three modern approaches:
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loosely, as this category of cases has by no means congealed into a clear concep-
tual framework.7 4 The interest can be conditional and allow states to change the
plan terms under certain circumstances. 75 Nevertheless, at some point, the in-
terest may become unconditional and protected from any and all detrimental
changes by the state. 6 Legal protection for public pensions may be grounded in
contract, related tort principles, and property.77 If state law accepts the modern
view, then employees will likely have more success challenging pension reforms
as violating the due process clause, takings clause, and contract clause of the
state or federal constitution.78 We argue that among the due process clause, tak-
ings clause, and contract clause, state and federal contract clauses will be the
major impediment to pension reform. We focus our analysis on court decisions
in the non-Social Security states.
constitutional protection of past and future benefit accruals, constitutional pro-
tection of past benefit accruals, and non-constitutional contract protection. An
additional complication is that courts and commentators use the term "vesting"
to mean different things without further elaboration and do not always distin-
guish between the satisfaction of service requirements and retirement eligibility.
We try to avoid the term in this Article.
74. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 7 (ast Cir. 1997) ("There is much disagreement on
the details."); see also id. (eschewing abstract theory in favor of contemplating the
structure of the state pension program at issue and the intent of the legislature
that created it). Notably, even the traditional view had variations in meaning. See
Kraus, 39o N.E.2d at 1285 (explaining conflicting Illinois decisions suggesting
whether benefits could be recalled entirely under the gratuity approach). In dis-
cussing public pension law in 1973, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts opined
that "the law in this country defining the character of retirement plans for public
employees was not settled at the time (indeed it remains unsettled today)." Op. of
the Justices to the House of Representatives, 303 N.E.2d at 326.
75. See, e.g., Parker, 123 F.3d at 7 (reviewing various approaches); see also discussion
infra Part II.B.3.
76. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
77. In determining federal constitutional protection, courts defer (albeit not entirely)
to the definitions of property and contract provided by state law. See Pineman v.
Oechslin, 637 F.2d 6o, 604 (2d Cir. 1981).
78. The legal analysis is substantially the same under federal or state law because the
majority of state constitutional clauses echo the federal constitutional clauses. See,
e.g., E-47o Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038, 1045 n.io (Colo. 2004)
(reading state and federal law in unison for a constitutional takings claim chal-
lenging public pension reform); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 753 (2o2)
("Generally, the federal and state constitutional guarantees against the impair-
ment of contractual obligations are interpreted essentially identically and given
the same effect.").
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1. Due Process Clause
As in many states, courts in Connecticut and Maine picture pensions as
property. 9 In both states, the pension expectation matures into a property right
at some point prior to retirement, possibly upon acceptance of employment."o
Courts review legislation for compliance with substantive due process under a
rational basis review"l: statutory changes will be upheld if they have a legitimate
purpose and the method of achieving that goal is reasonable.8" Thus, legislatures
in states that view pensions as property do not have an unfettered power of rev-
ocation, as employees not yet retired or eligible for retirement are protected
against purely arbitrary revisions. 8 3 This means, however, that legislatures need
only show that pension reforms bear some reasonable relation to state finances.
In contrast to the stricter level of judicial scrutiny under contract clause juris-
prudence discussed in Part 11.B.3, the legislature may have other alternatives
available to it (such as reducing state services or raising taxes), but still validly
choose the pension reform option. The showing is minimal and, as evidenced
by the cases, a fairly easy hurdle to overcome.8 4
In Spiller v. State,8, the Supreme Court of Maine determined that state ac-
tion excluding unused sick leave from the benefit calculation as well as increas-
ing the minimum retirement age and penalty for early retirement did not vio-
late due process.8 6 These pension reforms applied only to employees who had
not met the initial service requirement." Therefore, Maine's recent reforms, in-
79. Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 8o9-1o (Conn. 1985); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d
513, 516-17 (Me. 1993).
8o. See Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State and
Local Pensions, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RES., Bos. C. 3 (Aug. 2012), http://crr.bc
.edu/wp-content/uploads/2o12/o8/slp-25.pdf.
81. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984)
(applying rational basis review to due process claim regarding private pension
benefits).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Pineman, 488 A.2d at 81o.
84. See infra Part II.B.3; see also Paul M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public
Pensions, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing failure of due process
argument in Wisconsin public teacher pension case).
85. 627 A.2d 513, 516-17 (Me. 1993). For further analysis of the decision, see Andrew C.
Mackenzie, Note, Spiller v. State: Determining the Nature of Public Employees'
Rights to Their Pensions, 46 ME. L. REV. 355 (1994).
86. Spiller, 627 A.zd at 517 n.12.
87. Id. at 514.
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creasing the retirement age for those with less than five years of service, are un-
likely to merit a due process challenge.88
The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Pineman v. Oechslin 9 endorsed a
property approach once employees become eligible to receive benefits, but nev-
er reached the due process issue.90 A superior court applied Pineman in Levine
v. State Teachers Retirement Board91 to uphold COLA changes in the teachers'
retirement system. Teachers in the Connecticut public school system claimed
they had state and federal substantive due process guarantees to the COLA in
existence when they were eligible for retirement.92 The court noted, however,
that retirement eligibility and COLA eligibility were set at different times under
the statute, with COLA eligibility occurring only after retirement. 93 Therefore,
the court determined that the teachers did not have a property right in a partic-
ular COLA amount. 94 Even assuming a property interest in the COLA, the court
further found that the teachers did not satisfy their burden to show a violation
of their substantive due process rights.95 The court emphasized that the sponsor
of the reform bill stated that the teachers received higher salaries, which limited
the state's ability to fund their retirement system.96 Relying on this testimony,
the court held that there was no arbitrary forfeiture of retirement benefits by
modifying a prospective COLA.97 Accordingly, the due process hurdle is quite
low, with reasonable reforms fulfilling state and federal constitutional condi-
tions.
2. Takings Clause
Takings clause challenges also involve viewing pensions as property. State
and federal takings clauses recognize government power to take property and
limit the exercise of that power. Traditionally, the Takings Clause has been an
issue when the government formally condemns land through its power of emi-
nent domain, but it has many other applications, such as reforming public pen-
88. See PEW CHARITABLE TR., supra note 44; discussion supra Part IL.A (summarizing
reforms in non-Social Security states).
89. 488 A.2d 803 (Conn. 1985).
90. Id. at 81o.
91. No. CV 960562830, 1998 WL 46441, at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 1998) (hold-
ing that a modification of a prospective COLA does not impinge upon a public
employee's right to his or her retirement benefit).
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id. at *4.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *5-6.
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id. at *5-6.
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sions. However, we suggest that the takings clause is not much of a barrier to
pension reform.
Ohio provides an illustration. In State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Re-
tirement Board,9s the Supreme Court of Ohio found that a revocation of interest
earned on contributions prior to retirement did not constitute an unconstitu-
tional taking of property under state or federal law.99 Utilizing the triad of fac-
tors provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York, the Ohio court found that public pension funds were properly char-
acterized as public, not private, property, and that any economic impact was
offset by the potential benefits of a functioning retirement system.0 ° The court
additionally reasoned that there were no reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations to accrued interest because the reform removing the provision for inter-
est earned was in effect for as many or more years as the law providing for in-
terest and that, in any event, reliance on a state of affairs should not include the
challenged regulatory scheme.'0 '
Takings clause challenges are also largely, but not entirely, impacted by the
contract clause jurisprudence discussed in more detail below. 2 For instance, in
Maine Ass'n of Retirees v. Board of Trustees of Maine Public Employee Retirement
System, 0 3 the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that the re-
tirees lacked a contract right foreclosed the takings claim. 4 Even if pension
modifications were found to abridge state and federal constitutional rights, the
remedy available for a takings claim is "just compensation," rather than injunc-
98. 697 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio 1998).
99. Id. at 648-52.
1OO. Id. at 650 (citing Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). The
triad of factors are: (i) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action. See id.
1O. Id. at 650-52.
102. If no contract right is found, there is no takings claim. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d
513, 515 n.6 (Me. 1993) (noting that the lower court decided the case on the con-
tract clause despite the fact that the plaintiffs also argued a taking of their property
without compensation and without due process of law); Buck, supra note 48, at 2
n.6 (commenting that a takings violation is dependent on finding a contractual
right in the future stream of payments); id. at 49-50 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (finding that contracts are property within the
meaning of the takings clause)). If a contract right is found, pension modifica-
tions may not violate the contract clause if they are deemed a reasonable and nec-
essary government interest, but can still be considered an illegal taking because
the government justification is irrelevant. See Beermann, supra note 43, at 64.
103. 758 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2014).
104. Id. at 32 n.12.
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tive relief to bar the enforcement of pension reform measures. °5 As such, the
most serious constitutional objections to statutory reform in the public pension
field come from contract challenges.
3. Contract Clause
The remaining non-Social Security states, along with Maine and Ohio, dis-
cussed previously, adhere to a contract perspective limited by the contract
clause and subject to intermediate scrutiny."6 Stricter examination of legislation
concerning contract rights results in a higher degree of protection than for
property rights. Therefore, courts in jurisdictions recognizing pensions as con-
tracts are more likely to bar reform efforts.
To determine whether pension reform is an unconstitutional impairment
of an employee's contract, courts employ a three-part test: (i) whether there is a
contractual obligation; (2) if a contract exists, whether the legislation imposes a
substantial impairment; and (3) if there is an impairment, whether the legisla-
tion is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."7
a. Contract Existence
Determining the first element-the existence of a contract-varies across
jurisdictions. The source of the contract right may be found in the state consti-
tution, a statute, a judicial decision, or even a collective bargaining agree-
ment."os The most common basis for the contract is the state statute providing
105. Secunda, supra note 46, at 271 (outlining the differences in remedies between the
takings clause and contract clause).
1o6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § io (providing "No State shall ... pass any... Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts"); see also Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234, 240-44 (1978). While Maine and Ohio recognize pensions as property
and a contractual right, Connecticut appears to have rejected the contract ap-
proach entirely in favor of a property model. See Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d
803, 81o (Conn. 1985); supra Part II.B.
107. See Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244-50 (discussing the second and third parts of the
test); U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-18, 21, 28-29 (1977).
1o8. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 516 n.9 (Me. 1993). The non-Social Security states
of Alaska and Illinois have constitutional pension protection provisions. ALASKA
CONST. art XII, § 7 ("Membership in employee retirement systems of the State or
its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued bene-
fits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired."); ILL. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 5 ("Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of
local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall
be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be di-
minished or impaired.").
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for public pensions. ° 9 Courts tend to look to the relevant language as well as the
intent of the drafters to discern whether a contractual right was created against
the state." As a textual matter, federal and several state courts require clear and
unambiguous evidence of a contract."' The presumption against finding a con-
tract is predicated on the idea that legislatures, in enacting statutes, declare poli-
cy rather than binding contracts."2 Nevertheless, many decisions on constitu-
tional contract law still favor existing public employees and retirees."3 With
respect to these pension plan participants, the question is not only "if" there is a
contract, but "when" it was formed. Courts have given different answers."14
At one end of the spectrum are states like Alaska,"5 California,"6 Colora-
do," 7 Illinois,"8 Nevada," 9 and Massachusetts,' 20 among others, which find that
lo9. Because most state statutes do not expressly create a contract, the central judicial
inquiry is whether such a contract may be implied from the circumstances. See
Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The "California Rule" and Its Impact on
Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1037 n.39 (2012) (stating that collec-
tive bargaining contracts, often known as memoranda of understanding in the
public sector, may explicitly create a contract).
no. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17 n.14; see also Monahan, supra note 109, at 1038, 1041.
111. See, e.g., Pineman, 488 A.2d at 8o9-1o; Spiller, 627 A.2d at 515; State ex rel. Horvath
v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 653-54 (Ohio 1998). Courts have coined
the phrase "unmistakability doctrine" for this rule of construction. United States
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871 (1996); see also Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5
(lst Cir. 1997) (dating the history of the doctrine to Justice Marshall's opinion in
Fletcher v. Peck, io U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (181o)); Monahan, supra note 109, at 1076
(explaining that courts in California do not use this rule of construction and, in
fact, erroneously fail to inquire into legislative intent at all).
112. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470
U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps.' Ret. Sys.,
890 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (D.R.I. 1995) (describing the presumption as "no small hur-
dle to vault"). The strength of the presumption in any given case will depend on
what principles the court looks to for guidance. A court may simply conclude
there is no contract based on the absence of any reference to contract in the text.
See Parker, 123 F.3d at 9 (reserving the issue of whether the statute must expressly
employ contract language). Other courts may be willing to delve into legislative
history, if any.
113. Beermann, supra note 43, at 51-52 (discussing state constitutional law and ques-
tioning the use of this textual canon when the government is acting as an employ-
er).
114. See Parker, 123 F.3d at 9 (finding three possible interpretations of the statutory
language that guaranteed pension benefits once they are due: from the moment of
employment; upon completion of the initial service requirements, even if benefits
are not yet payable; and when benefits are literally due to be received at retire-
ment).
115. Alaska has language that specifically applies only to accrued benefits, but the
courts have interpreted the provision to protect all benefits from the time partici-
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a pension contract forms simultaneously with employment. 2' The effect of such
a "first day" rule is that future accruals may be protected or, in other words,
purely prospective changes to pension benefits may be null and void. 22 Because
the law in these states is extremely protective of public employees' and retirees'
pension expectations, legislatures in these states face the most difficult legal ob-
stacles to pension reform. Notably, reform would be especially onerous in Illi-
nois and Alaska, as it would require a constitutional amendment.'23
The inability of legislatures to respond to economic emergencies under the
first day rule is one reason why some court decisions appear to be liberalizing
pants enroll. Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981); see also
Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436, 441 (Alaska 1997).
116. See generally Monahan, supra note 109, at 1O51-69 (tracing the ninety-year history
of the California rule).
117. Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Colo. Springs, 784 P.2d 766, 771 (Colo.
1989).
118. Kraus v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1291-93 (111. App. Ct.
1979) (construing the 1970 Illinois Constitution as approving New York view that
employees receive protection at the time they become members of the system);
Eric.M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois? An
Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1774163 (discussing Illinois legislative history indicating an intent to pro-
tect employees upon joining the retirement system).
119. Nicholas v. State, 992 P.2d 262, 264 (Nev. 2000); Pub. Emps.' Ret. Bd. v. Washoe
Cnty., 615 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Nev. 198o); see also Monahan, supra note lo9, at 1040
(explaining that Nevada follows the California rule of contract clause analysis for
public pensions). Nevada provides even broader protection for workers than Cali-
fornia and other states. While California limits the contract right only to benefits
that accumulate during their service, see Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
Pasadena, 195 Cal. Rptr. 339, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), Nevada immunizes benefits
from alteration at the time of retirement and allows employees to keep even those
favorable changes that went into effect after the employee's service ended. Washoe
Cnty., 615 P.2d at 974 (finding the reduction in retirement benefits unconstitu-
tional after the repeal of a law quadrupling the amount of benefits a retired legis-
lator may receive, which went into effect after the legislator's service ended).
120. See generally Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 303 N.E.2d 320,
329 (Mass. 1973) (holding that a proposed increase in the contribution rate for
employees was presumptively invalid because no evidence had been presented to
excuse the impairment of the members' pension rights).
121. Monahan, supra note 109, at 1036, 1046, 1071 (counting twelve states that follow
the California approach but noting that three of them have now modified it: Ore-
gon, Colorado, and Massachusetts); see also Jonathan B. Forman, Funding Public
Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 866 (2009).
122. Monahan, supra note 109, at lO66-69 (discussing California law).
123. See supra note lO8 and accompanying text.
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this line of authority.'2 4 These decisions make clear that the question of contract
existence includes not only when the contract is formed, but also what it pro-
tects. For instance, a recent decision from Colorado distinguished core retire-
ment benefits protected upon employment from other plan provisions. 12 5 In
ruling the COLA reduction for employees and retirees constitutional, the dis-
trict court in Justus v. State'26 found no clear statutory language evidencing that
plan participants were entitled to an unchanged COLA for the duration of their
benefits.127 The court also emphasized the fact that the legislature had previously
changed the COLA for participants, holding that the revision negated any rea-
sonable expectations that the COLA would remain the same. 1" The court of ap-
peals, however, reversed and remanded.2 9 It held that the plaintiffs had a con-
tractual right to the COLA when their rights vested, which could not be reduced
unless the government satisfied the second and third prongs of the contract
analysis.3 ' In finding a contract right to a particular COLA amount, the appel-
late court relied on precedent from the Colorado Supreme Court holding that
employees had contract rights to pension escalation provisions. 3 ' The court rea-
soned that the COLAs at issue operated like these provisions because both in-
creased plan members' benefits after they have retired, pursuant to a specified
formula.32 The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals. 13 3 In holding that the retirees did not have a
contractual right to the COLA formula in effect at the time they became eligible
for retirement or retired, the court's ruling tracked the district court opinion. 3 4
124. Monahan, supra note 109, at 1072-73 (discussing decisions in Colorado and Ore-
gon).
125. Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589, slip op. at 9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011); see
also Monahan, supra note 109, at 1073 (noting that the district appears to break
with the California rule endorsed by the Colorado Supreme Court).
126. No. 2010-CV-1589, slip op. at 9.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Justus v. State, No. 1CA15o7, 2012 WL 4829545, at *1 (Colo. App. Oct. 11, 2012),
rev'd, No. 12SC9o6, 2014 WL 5393539, at *1 (Colo. Oct. 20, 2014).
130. Id. at *7. The appellate court clarified that the employees do not have a contractu-
al right to any increase in COLA that went into effect after they became eligible to
retire or retired. Id.
131. Id. at *6-7 (discussing Police Pension & Relief Bd. v. Bills, 366 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1961)
and Police Pension & Relief Bd. v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959)).
132. Id. at *7.
133. Justus, 2014 WL 5393539, at *1.
134. Id. at *2.
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It also distinguished, and, to some extent, overruled its former decisions that
the appellate court had followed.'35
Other states have relied on the same rationale as the Colorado Supreme
Court, holding that employees do not have an expectation to a specific un-
changing COLA amount. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Bartlett v. Cam-
eron,'36 for instance, found that the COLA's history of revision supported the
court's interpretation that such adjustments were legislative policy rather than
enforceable rights.Y7 Also important was that the COLA had been tied to infla-
tion, which allowed for it to decrease
38
A lower court in Massachusetts also deviated from the first day rule en-
dorsed by the state supreme court. The intermediate appellate court in Dullea v.
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority'39 allowed the complete repeal of
increased benefits thirty-seven days after enactment due to the lack of substan-
tial service under the provision.'40 It held that contract rights to pension bene-
fits originate "when the employees first began work."' 4' Moreover, like Colora-
do, a more recent decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Madden v.
Contributory Retirement Appeal Board42 emphasized its prior precedent separat-
ing core essential terms from those perceived to be peripheral.' 43 Accordingly,
legislatures contemplating statutory amendments need to consider carefully not
only if and when there is a contract, but also what terms are included within it.
The ongoing COLA litigation in many states that have upheld these reforms
suggests that judges in future cases may not strictly follow precedent and read
all plan provisions into the agreement.' 44 Rather, courts may scrutinize each
provision to discern whether it is a term of the contract.' 45 One lesson for law-
makers attempting to save money in order to salvage their retirement systems is
135. See id. at 1, *5-7.
136. 316 P.3d 889, 895 (N.M. 2013).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 421 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
140. Id. at 1235-36.
141. Id.
142. 729 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 2000).
143. Id. at lo98 (citing Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 303 N.E.2d
320 (Mass. 1973) (holding that the statutory contract language means that the gov-
ernment may not deprive members of the "core of... reasonable expectations"
they had when they entered the retirement system)).
144. See Munnell et al., supra note 58, at 4 ("Of the 17 states that changed their COLA,
12 have been challenged in court. The courts have ruled in nine states and in all
but one case have upheld the cut.").
145. See Hughes v. State, 838 P.2d lo18, 1033-34 (Or. 1992) (allowing removal of tax ex-
emption for pension benefits not yet earned through service).
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to differentiate primary from arguably ancillary terms."46 Distinguishing be-
tween COLAs and other retirement benefits is a prime example. Maine's COLA
changes were recently upheld on such grounds.'47 The type of COLA is also im-
portant, with an investment- or inflation-linked COLA formula more likely to
withstand constitutional challenge. Legislators should also consult the history of
state pension legislation. Past modifications of particular provisions may in-
crease the odds that such reforms will be allowed in the future.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are jurisdictions like Kentucky, 4' Loui-
siana, 49 Maine,'50 Missouri,'15' and Ohio.'52 These states find no contract until
retirement or upon qualification for retirement.'53 As a result, legislation ad-
versely affecting non-retired workers (and some existing workers who meet the
prescribed age and service requirements for retirement eligibility) will be up-
146. Cj. Smith v. Bd. of Trs. of La. State Emps' Ret. Sys., 851 So. 2d 111o, 11o5 (La. 2003)
(distinguishing between retirement benefits and reemployment benefits at issue in
the case); Stuart Buck, Pension Litigation Summary, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD
FOUND. 17 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
Pension%2oLitigation%2oSummaryo/.204.9.13.pdf (mentioning an Idaho state
court that ruled a "one-time incentive" for early retirement for teachers did not
indicate "legislative intent to create a contract").
147. See Me. Ass'n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of Maine Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23,
31 (1st Cir. 2014). Contra Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1332-33 (Cal. 1991) (find-
ing no COLA reduction is allowed once participant enters the system).
148. See City of Louisville v. Bd. of Educ., 163 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Ky. 1942).
149. See Smith, 851 So. 2d at 11o6-07. The Louisiana Constitution explicitly provides
that membership in any retirement system shall be a contractual relationship be-
tween employee and employer. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(B). Similar to Alaska and
Illinois, Louisiana constitutionally protects accrued benefits of state public pen-
sion plan participants. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E)(5). Rather than reading pension
contract rights to begin with employment, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted its constitution to protect benefits once a participant qualifies for re-
tirement under the plan. Smith, 851 So. 2d at 11o5 (noting that the constitutional
provision also declares that future benefits can be altered by legislative enactment
such that only benefits earned to date are protected).
150. See Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). Recall from the discussion supra
Part II.B.i that Maine protects pre-eligibility pension interests as a matter of prop-
erty.
151. See State ex rel. Phillip v. Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys., 262 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1953); Fraternal
Order of Police v. Saint Joseph, 8 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
152. See State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644, 653-54 (Ohio
1998).
153. The satisfaction of plan vesting requirements also triggers legal protection in
Connecticut. However, because that state rejects a contract in favor of a property
approach, pension reforms will stand if they satisfy due process of law. See Pine-
man v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 81o (Conn. 1985) (determining that the statutory
retirement plan for state employees was not contractual in nature).
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held under a contract challenge. For instance, despite its failure to find that the
pension statute constituted a contract for employees with fewer than seven
years of creditable service,'54 the Supreme Court of Maine in Spiller v. State left
the contract door ajar, allowing future legislative modifications of pension ben-
efits.'55 Following Spiller, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v.
Wakelin 56 further interpreted Maine's retirement statute to contractually bind
the state to provide an undiminished level of benefits only upon retirement.
5 7
Still other jurisdictions fall in between these two extremes. Courts draw
lines at some point after the onset of employment but before retirement eligibil-
ity. As such, it is potentially easier for state sponsors to alter existing benefits
than under the "first day" of government employment approach followed in
many non-Social Security states, but more difficult than under the "last day"
approach adopted in a few others. Instead of focusing on the day a contract
right obtains, this more moderate method of ascertaining constitutional safe-
guards directs attention to the reliance interests of public workers.' Ss Specifical-
ly, rights may arise pre-retirement eligibility under the doctrines of promissory
estoppel or quasi-contract.'5 9 Employment benefits are protected as a result of
proven reliance."'6 Moreover, at some point during the employment relation-
ship, reliance is presumed as a matter of law.'6'
154. Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 514-17 (Me. 1993) (reversing lower court decision that
contract rights begin upon employment).
155. Id. at 517 n.12 ("We do not here determine whether additional changes to the re-
tirement statute would implicate the contract ... clauses of our constitu-
tions....").
156. 123 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
157. Id. at 2 (reversing the district court decision determining that contract protection
began once a worker satisfied the service requirements).
158. Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 188 (W. Va. 1995) ("Scores of thousands of little
people have organized their lives around government pensions .. "). See general-
ly Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise:
Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV. 398
(1993) (positing a reliance-based approach to contract clause analysis).
159. Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808 (Conn. 1985) (discussing contract implied
in law approach); Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 476 (Kan. 198o) (findng
that a public employee acquires a contract right in a pension plan after "contin-
ued employment over a reasonable period of time during which substantial ser-
vices are furnished to the employer, plan membership is maintained, and regular
contribution into the funds are made"); Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emps.
Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Minn. 1983); Sims, 456 S.E.2d at 181 (declaring that a
protectable interest depends on whether the employee had a sufficient number of
years within the system to have "relied substantially to his or her detriment on the
existing pension benefits and contribution schedules").
16o. The West Virginia Supreme Court announced: "changes can be made with regard
to employees with so few years of service that they cannot be said to have relied to
their detriment. Line drawing in this latter regard must be made on a case-by-case
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In the non-Social Security states specifically, decisions from Maine and
Massachusetts indicate that reliance interests may trigger constitutional protec-
tion. While Maine's pension statute has been read to create contract rights upon
retirement, the Supreme Court of Maine declared the promissory estoppel op-
tion potentially available to prevent detrimental changes to pension benefits.'62
Thus, Maine apears to have moved to an intermediate position of pension con-
tract formation. Remember, too, that an appellate court in Massachusetts, a ju-
risdiction following the first day rule of pension contract protection, announced
that a contract right arises after "substantial service. "163
Additional possibilities exist for mid-career pension protection. Courts
could adopt an approach that secures public pensions, like private pensions, af-
ter an employee completes the requisite service under the plan.'6 4 Alternatively,
safeguarding benefits actually earned to date would mirror private sector pen-
sion protection and allow legislative changes for future service.'6 5 It is this par-
basis, but after ten years of state service detrimental reliance is presumed." Sims,
456 S.E.2d 5 15, at 172 (syllabus by the court).
161. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a "promissory estoppel approach"
and equated it to a contract implied in law, often referred to as a quasi-contract.
Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 748 (finding unconstitutional a suspension of retiree
benefits due to an increase in retirement age); see also Pineman, 488 A.2d at 8o8
(discussing Minnesota's approach that "a statutory pension plan is found to con-
stitute a contract implied in law based upon the reasonable expectations of the
public employees"). The court reserved judgment on whether a contract approach
may be viable in future cases. Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 748.
162. See Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 516-17 (Me. 1993) (citing Christensen, 331 N.W.2d
at 748). In response to the federal court ruling in Parker v. Wakelin, which pro-
tected public pensions upon retirement, the Maine legislature amended the pen-
sion statute and replaced it with clear contract language that stated benefits com-
menced when the member satisfied the service requirement. Me. Ass'n of Retirees
v. Bd. of Trs. of Maine Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2014).
163. See Dullea v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 421 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
(finding that a contract right arises after substantial services are provided); accord
Singer, 607 P.2d at 475 (finding that more than eleven years of service is substan-
tial service). An early decision in California came to a similar conclusion. See Kern
v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947) (stating that an employee has
"pension rights as soon as he has performed substantial services for his employ-
er").
164. See Singer, 607 P.2d at 474 (citing cases from Arkansas, Delaware, and Pennsylva-
nia); Buck, supra note 48, at 33 (relying on federal precedent construing statutory
contract claims under ERISA); see also Hurd v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942, 946
(7th Cir. 1956) (finding that a "pension plan is a unilateral contract which creates
a vested right in those employees who accept the offer it contains by continuing in
employment for the requisite number of years"). But see Parker v. Wakelin, 123
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing a court decision adopting the satisfaction of ser-
vice paradigm).
165. Madiar, supra note 68, at 183.
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ticular middle ground that has generated the approval of legal scholars.'66 Ac-
cepting the concept of pensions as deferred compensation,6 ' Professor Mo-
nahan argues that no employee can have a reasonable expectation of future
benefits given the nature of the employment relationship.1"' Subject to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, employees can have their salaries reduced or even
terminated at any time for almost any reason.169 Professor Monahan's argument
makes sense, but her logic does not necessarily extend to discrete groups of gov-
ernment workers, like tenured teachers, who have heightened protection from
the loss of employment.
If no contract exists between the government pension plan sponsor and its
participants, pension reforms are constitutional. If a contract is found, be it on
the first or last day of employment, or somewhere in between, pension reforms
may withstand constitutional challenge if the legislative changes do not substan-
tially impair that contract, or if they are found to be reasonable and necessary.
b. Substantial Impairment
The second prong of the contract analysis, requiring substantial impair-
ment, is another serious obstacle to pension reform. The Supreme Court has
given little guidance as to what constitutes a substantial impairment of a pen-
sion contract.' The Court has indicated that the requisite degree of impair-
ment may be measured by reference to the values underlying the common law
of contracts. 7' This suggests a balancing approach where courts weigh the poli-
cies of certainty and fairness on a case-by-case basis. For the sake of simplicity,
courts considering public pension contracts could weigh certainty (in terms of
the participants' need to order their financial affairs) against fairness (in terms
166. See Monahan, supra note 109, at 1076-79 (asserting that theory and public policy
support the idea that government workers are only entitled to the benefits they
have accrued during their employment); Buck, supra note 48, at 3 ("This theory
coheres with most of the case law construing federal and state contracts clauses.").
But see Madiar, supra note 68, at 192-93 (criticizing Professor Amy Monahan's po-
sition that contract protections should extend to what workers have accrued).
167. Buck, supra note 48, at 4 (viewing pensions as back-loaded salary).
168. Monahan, supra note 109, at 1078-79; cj. Beermann, supra note 43, at 59-60
(agreeing with Monahan's argument only to the extent that it is supported by the
policy of flexibility).
169. Monahan, supra note 109, at 1078-79.
170. Id. at 1041 n.7o. Under the original understanding of the Contract Clause, all ret-
rospective modifications of contractual obligations were unconstitutional. See
Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (1987).
171. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978).
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of state legislatures' need to maintain flexibility).1 72 In short, "substantial"
would seem to mean a material rather than a minor breach.73
Not all state courts interpreting their own constitutional provisions use the
language "substantial impairment," but they often espouse a similar, if not
identical, standard. 74 California's version, for instance, measures whether dis-
advantages are offset by new advantages. 175 In California, changes to benefit
formulas,' 76 funding sources, and methodology' 77 have each been held to be
substantial impairments of the pension contract.17 Conversely, changes to actu-
arial factors reducing employer contributions (rather than altering benefit cal-
culations) were not deemed substantial.' 79 Illinois courts discern whether the
modification directly or indirectly diminishes the benefits."O Other jurisdictions
have found participants' contract rights impaired by increasing minimum age
172. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor & City Council, 6 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that inducement to contract and reasonable reliance are determinants
of impairment).
173. See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1977); see also id. at 31 (citing El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965)).
174. At least one state foregoes any remaining analysis after finding a contract. Yeazell
v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 546 (Ariz. 1965) (finding that a contract begins at em-
ployment and may not be changed without employee consent).
175. California's concept of contract seems to conflate the second and third prongs of
the standard contract approach. See Monahan, supra note 109, at 1o64 (noting
ambiguity); see also Munnell & Quinby, supra note 80, at 2-3 (putting California's
test in the third prong of the contract standard).
176. See Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614, 619 (Cal. 1978).
177. See Bd. of Admin. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 213, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997);
Valdes v. Cory, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212, 224-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
178. For decisions in other states, see Deonier v. State, 760 P.2d 1137, 1141-42, 1146 (Ida-
ho 1988), which deemed offsetting pension benefits by the amount of workers'
compensation benefits to be a substantial impairment; and Calabro v. City of
Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995), which found cost-of-living supplemental
payments to be a substantial impairment.
179. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of San Diego, 667 P.2d 675, 679-81 (Cal. 1983).
Other pension reforms outside of California that did not rise to the level of sub-
stantial impairments include reducing the amount of employer contributions
where there was no evidence that doing so would render the pension system actu-
arially unsound, investing pension assets in a state prison construction project,
accounting changes, changing the default rules for beneficiary designations, and
providing participants a choice of continuing to accrue benefits under an old
formula or moving to a new accrual structure. Monahan, supra note 68, at 632
(citing cases from Washington, West Virginia, South Dakota, and Maryland, re-
spectively).
18o. Kraus v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 39o N.E.2d 1281, 1293 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (finding Illinois lawmakers had a New York state of mind).
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requirements for retirement,'"' mandating unpaid leave, '82 and doubling em-
ployee contributions without added benefits.'8 3
Analyzing case outcomes across approximately half of the United States,
Professor Monahan concluded that the second part of the three-part constitu-
tional contract standard has created a serious barrier to pension reform, since
many reforms of public pension plans have been found to be impairments.'8 4 In
the thirteen states where pensions are a substitute for federal Social Security
benefits, we believe that reforms are even more likely to be barred as a constitu-
tional harm because public pension benefits are the one and only retirement
payment from any government in these states. Indeed, in considering the public
pension crisis, many scholars have emphasized that the absence of additional
federal benefits places these particular public workers in a more precarious po-
sition.1"5
c. Reasonable and Necessary to Accomplish an Important Objective
Despite the existence of a contract and its substantial impairment, state re-
forms may still survive under the third prong of the contract clause analysis if
they are reasonable and necessary to accomplish an important purpose.
Under the federal ends-means analysis, the purpose of the reform is suffi-
ciently important if it is meant to accomplish a broad social or economic objec-
tive rather than favoring narrow special interests.'86 The method is reasonable
and necessary if the government did not assume the risk of the events prompt-
ing the change and there was no other way to solve the problem.'8 7 Satisfying
both will shield state pension reforms from constitutional challenge.' Courts
testing legislative objectives under state law appear to ascribe to a similar stand-
ard of review. In Massachusetts, for example, judges use more lenient language
181. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emps. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 751 (Minn.
1983). Mandatory retirement age reductions, in contrast, have been allowed. See
Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293.
182. Op. of the Justices, 609 A.2d 1204, 12o8, 1210-11 (N.H. 1992).
183. Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 476 (Kan. 198o); cJ. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at
1293 (suggesting that increasing contribution rates to some employees to equalize
their contributions with those of others would not be prohibited).
184. Monahan, supra note 68, at 624; see also Monahan, supra note 109, at 1035 n.29
(clarifying that her prior research reviewed twenty-four jurisdictions).
185. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 109, at 1076.
186. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983).
187. U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1977).
188. Unlike the deference given legislatures in determining the existence of a contract,
courts tend to scrutinize legislative justifications for changing contractual terms.
See id. at 25-26 (finding that courts defer to a lesser degree when the state is a par-
ty to the contract because the state's self-interest is at stake).
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
and ask whether the modifications are reasonable and "bear a material relation-
ship to the theory of the pension system and its successful operation. '"s9
In considering public pension reform, reducing the budget deficit is likely
to be considered an important purpose.' 0 But cutting pension benefits may not
be deemed necessary to accomplish that purpose.' 9' However, recent reforms
related to teacher pensions in one state were upheld on state constitutional con-
tract grounds because they created accountability with the public school system
and maintained a system of free public education.' 92 State reforms may better
surmount a contract clause challenge if they have already attempted other ways
to address their monetary woes.'93
Relying on Supreme Court precedent that found economic interests a de-
fensible use of state power, one scholar predicts that states may use the reces-
sion to justify pension modifications under the necessity exception.' 94 By analo-
gy to the doctrine of excuse in contract theory, states raising the defense must
show they had no reason to know of a possible drastic drop in the market value
of their public pensions.'95 Still, simply showing the unanticipated severity of
the financial crisis may not be enough 96
189. Madden v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 729 N.E.2d 1095, 1O98 (Mass. 2000) (cit-
ing Wisley v. San Diego, 188 Cal. App. 2d 482, 485-86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(finding a teacher's part-time service may be prorated to reduce creditable service
after she entered the retirement system because the regulation was correcting a
disparity in treatment)).
19o. See, e.g., Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 515 (Me. 1993) (noting lower court ruling
that reducing budget deficit satisfied the ends requirement but that pension cuts
failed to meet the means requirement); Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emps.
Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 751 (Minn. 1983) (cutting expenditures at a time of fiscal
distress is a legitimate and significant public purpose).
191. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Bd. v. Washoe Cnty., 615 P.2d 972, 973-74 (Nev. 198o) (finding
denial of early retirement to certain public employees was unreasonable and un-
necessary without evidence the change was essential to maintain the integrity or
flexibility of the system).
192. See Buck, supra note 48, at 17 (citing Idaho case).
193. Bait. Teachers Union v. Mayor & City Council, 6 F.3d 1012, 1020-21 (4th Cir. 1993).
194. See Whitney Cloud, Comment, State Pensions Deficits, the Recession, and a Modern
View of the Contracts Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 2199, 2208-09 (2011). But see Note, Public
Employee Pensions in Times of Fiscal Distress, 90 HARV. L. REV. 992, 999-1003
(1976) (analyzing possible pitfalls to modifications of public pensions due to eco-
nomic crises).
195. Cloud, supra note 194, at 2205.
196. See id.; see also AFSCME v. City of Benton, Ark., 513 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2008)
(calling for "unprecedented emergencies, such as mass foreclosures caused by the
Great Depression"); Peterson v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 759 P.2d 720, 725-26
(Colo. 1988) (allowing alteration of survivor pension benefits "to avoid bankrupt-
ing the Denver system and others throughout the state"); cJ. Buck, supra note 48,
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State governments are even less likely to justify pension reform when equi-
table arguments are available to challengers. Specifically, the government's re-
sort to the excuse doctrine may be rebuffed by equitable principles given that
states are at least partly responsible for the present predicament.' 97 As indicated
earlier, in many cases, proof of persistent underfunding aggravated actuarial
deficits and made pensions susceptible to the stock market plunge in the first
place. Equitable theories of unclean hands or estoppel would be particularly apt
should governments attempt to use a different discount rate to establish excuse
than the discount rate used to set their contributions.
Of the three constitutional provisions previously discussed, reform
measures face the most serious challenge from state and federal constitutional
contract clauses. This issue is important, as it can lead to vastly different pay-
ments to employees, depending on whether the reforms are upheld. For exam-
ple, the seemingly small 1.5% COLA reduction in Colorado at issue in Justus v.
State had a serious financial impact on pension participants. Retirees who re-
ceived a pension of $33,254 in 2009 will lose more than $165,ooo in benefits over
a twenty-year period.'9s Studies suggest that eliminating a two percent com-
pounded COLA reduces lifetime benefits by at least fifteen percent and that
eliminating a three percent COLA reduces benefits by up to twenty-five per-
cent. 99 Moreover, COLA cuts are particularly detrimental in states like Maine
and Colorado, where employees are not covered by Social Security, which is ful-
ly adjusted for price increases.200 COLAs, as a result, provide retirement income
valuable protection against inflation. Of course, the same reforms will save tax-
payers billions.
Most states have avoided any litigation by reserving pension reform, other
than COLA cuts, for new hires. This is true even in states where contract rights
do not exist until retirement eligibility, which suggests that those state govern-
ments at least can do more to remedy their retirement systems. Even in states
that protect pensions upon employment, there may be avenues to uphold cer-
at 46 ("Court holdings on the necessity exception tend to veer in different direc-
tions.").
197. T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a
Pluralistic Model of Law, ii LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633, 66o (2007); T. Leigh Anen-
son, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG.
377, 390-91 (2008); see also T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment
Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 47-48 (2005) (comparing equitable de-
fenses).
198. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 8-9, Justus v. State, No. 2010-CV-1589
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 17, 2010).
199. See Munnell et al., supra note 58, at 3 tbl.i.
200. See id. at 3. The current low inflation environment may not undercut retirement
earnings too severely, but real earnings will erode if inflation rises. See id. at 4.
Moreover, in Maine and Illinois, employees with higher benefits will be harmed
because these states targeted COLA reforms to retirees with lower benefits. Id.
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tain provisions not yet addressed in the decisional law. For example, given the
recent cases upholding COLA reform, states may take advantage of current de-
velopments by asserting that a particular reform measure is not a term of the
contract under the first element. Or, under the third element, governments may
attempt to show that they have otherwise exhausted efforts to rectify their re-
tirement system.
However, governments may find it particularly difficult to reform teacher
plans for existing employees in non-Social Security states. Once tenured, a court
may find that a contract exists for future benefits. In addition, under the second
element, any detrimental change may be held as an unjustifiable impairment
because of the lack of Social Security as a safeguard.
Given the uncertainty of the law in many states, it is impossible to accurate-
ly forecast whether contract challenges will be overcome. Moreover, in a state
like California, where there have been many successful challenges to pension
reform legislation, it makes sense for the government to simply limit reform
measures to new hires. Finally, in the event that reform measures modifying
plan terms do withstand legal challenge, they may not be enough to solve the
underlying pension-funding problem.
Our study of the political and legal context of public pension reform pro-
vides a basis for conversation on how best to revamp these failing systems. Per-
vasive investment losses make it necessary to put money into these plans, but
this also means there is less money available to pay contributions. Growing ob-
ligations raise the specter of more taxes and fewer public services, including
state funding of education.0 1 This dire financial situation also presents the pos-
sibility of a costly federal bailout. 2
III. DEVELOPING A DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK: DISCUSSION AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS
The previous sections examined the financial, political, and legal settings
related to public pensions, including the plans of teachers in non-Social Securi-
ty states. With these considerations in mind, this section suggests a comprehen-
sive set of reform measures. These policy prescriptions are provided along with
201. See, e.g., Gina M. Raimondo, Truth in Numbers: The Security and Sustainability of
Rhode Island's Retirement System, OFF. GEN. TREASURER (May 2011),
http://www.ricouncil94.org/Portals/o/Uploads/Documents/General%2oTreasurer
%2oRaimondo%2oreport.pdf ("In recent years, state aid to cities and towns, which
is used mostly for K-12 education, has decreased annually by eight percent .... ").
202. We do not favor the kind of federal intervention historically provided to the pri-
vate sector, such as the automotive industry and financial services. See T. Leigh
Anenson & Donald 0. Mayer, "Clean Hands" and the CEO: Equity as an Antidote
to Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 947, 948-50 (2010) (explaining how
banks were able to privatize the gain and ultimately socialize the risk during the
most recent financial meltdown); Hylton, supra note 51, at 434-36 (discussing the
outlay of taxpayer dollars as a windfall to banks and not to borrowers).
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criteria by which to evaluate the reforms. The evaluation criteria are presented
as principles reflecting an often-conflicting range of values. These common
goals of social policy include efficiency, equity, and adequacy."°3
The policymaking methodology directs attention to pension plans and to
the political reality of their creation and continued operation. This means ad-
dressing both the internal environment of public pensions, such as contribution
and benefit levels, as well as the external environment. Analysts increasingly
point to the political dimension, or moral hazard, as the predominant source of
the public pension problem. 0 4 By bringing both theorists and empiricists into
the discussion of public pensions, along with our own analysis and estimations,
we aim to enhance the quality of the debate over the relative merits of compet-
ing reform proposals.
Our comprehensive set of recommendations includes enacting legislation
that would require mandatory pension funding and prohibit the improper use
of pension fund assets; amending balanced budget constraints that adversely
impact funding; and adopting a uniform state law that would impose transpar-
ency, uniformity, and accuracy in the valuation of public pensions. While we
caution against banning union activity, we suggest a bar may be appropriate if
union negotiations contribute to the pension deficit, the risk of plan failure is
imminent, and other available options for reform are exhausted. With respect
to the pension plans themselves, we offer options for plan modification or rede-
sign. Finally, because our focus is on plans that do not contribute to Social Se-
curity, we counsel states to consider adopting or enrolling in that federal pro-
gram or adopting a state insurance program that would shield public employees
from losing their retirement savings in the event of plan failure.
A. Minimizing Moral Hazard
Short-term political manipulations have resulted in long-term harm to
public employee retirement systems. The political risks associated with public
pensions are unknown in the private sector and deserve consideration in any
comprehensive reform package. Corrective measures should therefore restrain
political leaders who are incentivized to supply potentially excessive benefits
and restrict unions that demand such benefits for their members without regard
for whether these obligations can be met. To date, negotiations have typically
taken place without input from the unengaged public.
203. These norms are implicit in the recent legal and economic literature on public
pensions and explicit in publications addressing other issues involving retirement
income security. See, e.g., Robert Costrell, et al., Fixing Teacher Pensions: Is it
Enough to Adjust Existing Plans?, EDuc. NEXT, Fall 2011, at 60; Brian J. Kreiswirth,
The Role of the Basic Public Pension in a Retirement Income Security System, 19
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y 393 (1998) (discussing values of fairness, adequacy, and effi-
ciency).
204. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 51, at 414.
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i. Lawmakers
This section confronts the political dimension of public pension promises.
Politicians who sacrifice future benefits for present interests put pension securi-
ty at risk.2"5 Too often, elected officials spend public dollars with less care than
they would spend private dollars2 °6 Pension benefits are usually increased dur-
ing economic boom cycles but not decreased during the bust cycles .2 7 Indeed,
in the same way states lower contribution levels and retirement ages when stock
prices rise, governments promised workers better compensation and benefit
packages when the housing boom raised property tax revenues." 8 Public sector
employment packages were so good that some analysts found that they exceed-
ed private sector packages.0 9
In addition to the political incentives to provide excessive benefits, there are
two main dangers related to pension fund assets: borrowing and underfund-
ing 1° Examples abound. Because pension funds hold massive assets,"' legisla-
tors in California and other states dip into them to pay unrelated bills. l More-
over, Illinois has not made its full pension contribution since 1970.2"3 Funding
205. See, e.g., Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 183 (W.Va. 1994) ("It is a recurrent prob-
lem of government that today's elected officials curry favor with constituents by
promising benefits that must be delivered by tomorrow's elected officials.").
2o6. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, Pension Funding in the Public Sector, 76
REV. ECON. & STAT. 278, 282-83 (1994).
207. See Hylton, supra note 51, at 445 (using California as an example of this phenom-
enon); see also PEW CHARITABLE TR., supra note 44, at i (noting that states have
historically ignored their retirement obligations in both good times and bad).
2o8. Hylton, supra note 51, at 421-22.
209. Id. at 422 (citations omitted).
210. See, e.g., Darryl B. Simko, Of Public Pensions, State Constitutional Contract Protec-
tion, and Fiscal Constraint, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1o59, o6o (1996) ("Borrowing pen-
sion monies and under-funding pension systems are the modern realizations of
this potential for abuse [unknown in the private sector].").
211. See, e.g., Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 11, at 1213 (noting that the 116 state plans
studied had $1.94 trillion in total assets in 2009).
212. See Mitchell & Smith, supra note 206, at 278 (discussing state government borrow-
ing from public pension funds).
213. Nanette Byrnes & Christopher Palmeri, Sinkhole! How Public Pension Promises Are




level declines have been persistent across states.1 4 The situation is bad and get-
ting worse. 15
Professor Jack Beermann provides one of the most inclusive accounts of the
political economy of public pensions."6 With respect to underfunding public
pensions, he explains that it is in substance an example of deficit spending."'
Basically, current taxpayers enjoy the benefits of government services while
passing the costs onto future taxpayers." 8 The next generation will be required
to pay for the excesses of prior generations and, at the same time, receive less
government services as states allocate limited funds to pensions for retirees. 9
Given these inherent risks, our discussion centers on three possible re-
forms.2 First, we propose that state governments impose new funding re-
quirements. Second, we suggest that states modify state budget requirements
that encourage underfunding. Third, we urge states to enact prohibitions
against the misuse of fund assets.
214. Given the horrific budget issues facing most states, lawmakers will be even more
apt to take funding holidays. See, e.g., Ellman & Merrett, supra note 73, at 367-69
(detailing statistics on funding level decline for public pensions).
215. For fiscal year 2008, the Pew Center found that states and localities fell short of
funding their pension plans by $452 billion of pension liabilities. PEW CHARITABLE
TR., supra note 11 (reporting total shortfall more than $i trillion if retiree health
care and other benefits are included).
216. Beermann, supra note 43, at 29 (commenting that economists and political scien-
tists began studying the problem as early as the 1970s).
217. Id. at 32; accord Simko, supra note 210, at 1o61. Politicians benefit from deficit
spending because it allows them to reward supporters (government workers) with
additional services (or in this case pension benefits) without requiring the public
to pay for them. Beermann, supra note 43, at 33. They are also out of office when
the bill comes due. Id.
218. Beermann, supra note 43, at 33.
219. Id.
220. We focus on funding policy shown to be the major concern with unfunded liabili-
ties. See Costrell et al., supra note 203, at 66 (noting studies indicating that fund
mismanagement is not the primary cause of the pension deficit). There are, of
course, other options. States may choose to focus on future benefits, see Aaron
Burgin, Carlsbad Pension Reform Initiative Wins, UT SANDIEGO, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/20oO/nov/o2/carlsbad-pension-reform-
initiative-leading- in -earl (discussing initiative in Carlsbad, California, requiring
voter approval of future employee benefits), or seek to improve investment deci-
sions or even governance structures that may also improve pension health. See
generally Kathleen Paisley, Public Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation
of Trustee Investment Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 188 (1986) (seeking federal
regulation of trustee investment decisions); Sharon Reece et al., Regulating Public
Pension Fund Investments: The Role of Federal Legislation, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 1O
(1992) (advocating federal tax policy to promote state pension funds to target cer-
tain kinds of investments in the state).
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a. Funding Requirements
As an initial matter, lawmakers should restrain underfunding of public
pensions by enacting legislation compelling a certain range of funding. The ex-
act level, full funding or something less, should be enough to ensure the pay-
ment of future liabilities.22 ' In short, to the extent possible, states should be re-
quired to set aside enough assets in their pension funds to provide retirement
benefit cash flows for these payments.2 In the non-Social Security states, court
decisions in Alaska and California, two states with constitutional contract pro-
tection for the pensions of public employees upon acceptance of employ-
ment,2 3 have held that actuarially-sound funding is a contractually protected
term of the pension program. 4 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has de-
termined that this protection extends only to benefits, not funding.2
b. Balanced Budget Constraints
As a related matter, state governments should modify existing balanced
budget constraints, if any. Balanced budget requirements were put in place in
many states to avoid accelerating budget deficits, but they have had unintended
consequences for public pensions." 6 Borrowing to satisfy operating expenses
may not be available in tight fiscal times, so underfunding pensions allows state
221. The optimal funding level is beyond the scope of this Article. See Costrell et al.,
supra note 203, at 66 (outlining the problem of overfunding); Forman, supra note
121, at 86o (urging full funding of public pensions despite potential misuse by
employees and lawmakers); Norcross & Biggs, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing new
statute in New Jersey that put on ballot constitutional requirement to fully fund
pensions).
222. See Simko, supra note 210, at 1O65-79 (listing states that already require adequate
funding levels); see also Beermann, supra note 43, at 43 n.146 (commenting that
any attempt to move to actuarially-adequate funding may be impossible or ex-
tremely difficult for many states).
223. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
224. See Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion, 944 P.2d 436 (Ala. 1997); Valdes v. Cory,
189 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see also Stone v. State, 664 S.E.2d 32 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2008) (citing opinions from other jurisdictions, including West Virginia,
New York, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).
225. See McNamee v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill. 1996).
226. See Barbara A. Chaney et al., The Effect of Fiscal Stress and Balanced Budget Re-
quirements on the Funding and Measurement of State Pension Obligations, 21 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 287, 293 (2002).
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governments to balance their budgets without cutting services.227 Thus, there is
a positive correlation between underfunding and balanced budgets." To pre-
vent balanced budget regulation from undercutting pension funding, states can
simply change the law to delineate pension funding as a current cost. 9
c. Misuse of Assets
Our last recommendation to deter the morally hazardous behavior of state
legislatures concerns the inappropriate use of pension fund assets. Like federal
regulation of private pensions, states should consider measures prohibiting the
removal of trust assets and limit other uses to arms' length transactions subject
to fiduciary standards. 3 For example, loans made with pension assets should
require a reasonable rate of interest and security if appropriate. Moreover, ad-
ministrators should act solely for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries.
States should deal directly with funding issues by mandating a particular
level of funding, amending balanced budget laws, and barring the improper use
of fund assets. These safeguards would deter the dynamic of rent seeking by
politicians and better align the spending of public dollars with the best interests
of the taxpaying public.
2. Labor Leaders
In addition to curtailing political behavior on the supply side of the pension
problem, states may consider curbing the demand side. Because most public
school teachers are unionized, 3 ' restricting collective bargaining over retire-
ment income would eliminate some of the pressure on lawmakers to provide
unsustainable benefits. To be sure, even in those states without a substantial le-
227. Id; see also Beermann, supra note 43, at 35-36 (concluding that "the short-term
nature of state budgeting and the inapplicability of 'balanced budget' require-
ments conspire to create a long term mess of underfunded pension obligations").
228. Chaney et al., supra note 226, at 306-07 (finding state balanced budget require-
ments negatively correlated with pension funding to full actuarial standards).
229. See Beermann, supra note 43, at 36. Because pension promises are an off-budget
method of providing compensation to state employees for current services, the
larger the share that can be paid in the form of deferred compensation, the more
services government can provide out of current revenue.
230. C]. Ridgeley A. Scott, A Skunk at a Garden Party: Remedies for Participants in State
and Local Pension Plans, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 507, 547-58 (1998) (advocating federal
regulation of trust assets). The federal funding and fiduciary duty rules mandated
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for private pension
plans do not extend to public plans. Id.
231. Beermann, supra note 43, at 23.
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gal barrier to pension reform,232 attempts to change the retirement system may
still be thwarted by the political barrier of a union.
Professor Maria O'Brien Hylton outlines the debate for and against such a
ban before staking a more moderate position. 33 As she explains, proponents of
denying collective bargaining claim that the retirement benefits of government
workers result from a process that disadvantages taxpayers. 3 4 Opponents, in-
cluding Professor Paul Secunda and the International Labor Organization, ar-
gue that collective bargaining is a moral imperative and a fundamental human
right.235
Hylton questions, however, whether the opponents' position should extend
to public employees, pointing to fundamental distinctions between public and
private sector employees that justify a difference in treatment. 36 She notes that
collective bargaining in the public sector is a relatively recent phenomenon and
lacks a long-standing tradition. 37 As she observes, unlike their counterparts in
the private sector, public employees do not typically generate profits and may
negotiate to secure a larger slice of taxpayer dollars in the form of benefits and
other compensation.23 Unions therefore have the power to raid the public
fisc.239 Hylton concludes that restricting union activity with regard to public
pensions may be proper in exceptional cases. 40 We agree.
As a practical matter, prohibiting or even limiting collective bargaining in
the public sector would provoke fierce resistance. Recently, massive protests to
government regulation of union rights concerning pensions in Wisconsin and
other states suggest that an embargo should be considered as a last resort.24'
232. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a (explaining that Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Missouri, and Ohio do not protect pensions under a contract analysis until re-
tirement).
233. Hylton, supra note 51, at 472-82.
234. Id. at 476; see also Beermann, supra note 43, at 23-24 (providing example of exces-
sive benefits due to legislative largesse and overly zealous unionized public school
teachers in Rhode Island).
235. Hylton, supra note 51, at 476 n.188 ( "[Tihe ILO, a United Nations agency that
promotes labor rights, is one of many groups that believe collective bargaining is a
democratic right, not a mere economic procedure.") (internal citation ommitted).
236. Id. at 480-81.
237. Id.
238. Id. ("When public employees strike, they strike against taxpayers.").
239. Id.; see also Beermann, supra note 43, at 29-30 (explaining the unions have placed
a higher priority on current wages than on adequate funding of pension promis-
es).
240. Hylton, supra note 51, at 417 (noting that it may be necessary to prohibit bargain-
ing over retirement income in extreme cases).
241. See Steven Greenhouse, Strained States Turning to Laws to Curb Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1/o1/o4/business/o4labor.html
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Non-Social Security state plans in the most precarious financial position, like
Illinois, may need to consider this option. Pension underfunding undermined
the state's credit rating and increased its general cost of borrowing.2 42 Of course,
states should study their own collective bargaining experience to see if such a
prohibition would actually remove barriers to necessary reformsA3 For exam-
ple, Texas's prohibition on public sector collective bargaining is partially credit-
ed for its successful implementation of public pension reform.? Politicians
("[L]awmakers in Indiana, Maine, Missouri and seven other states plan to intro-
duce legislation that would bar private sector unions from forcing workers they
represent to pay dues or fees, reducing the flow of funds into union treasuries.");
Joe Newby, Thousands Protest in Los Angeles in Support of Public Sector Unions,
EXAMINER.COM, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.examiner.com/conservative-in
-spokane/thousands-protest-los-angeles-support-of -public-sector-unions; Mark
Niquette & Stephanie Armour, Democrats From Wisconsin, Indiana Take Haven in
Illinois to Block Bills, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-02-23/wisconsin-indiana-democrats-flee-to-illinois-to-block-union-rights
-votes.html (reporting that Democratic lawmakers are fleeing their states to stall
votes on Republican-backed bills restricting union rights). Labor struggles in Wis-
consin have received the most attention. See Secunda, supra note 46, at 263 (dis-
cussing pension reform bill in Wisconsin that strips most collective bargaining
rights from most public-sector employees).
242. Illinois's pension problems caused a downgrade to its credit, which was already
the lowest in the nation, and will increase interest rates on borrowed money. See,
e.g., Brian Chappatta & Tim Jones, Illinois Losing Rally as State Fails to Fix Pension:
Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/213-o6
-04/illinois-losing-rally-as-state-fails-to-fix-pension-muni-credit.html; Associated
Press, Illinois: Pension Woes Cause Downgrade to Credit, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o6/04/us/illinois-pension-woes-cause-downgrade
-to-credit.html.
243. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Union-Free State Not Spared Fiscal Woes, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/politcs/union-free-virginia
-note-spared-state-pension-woes/20n/o316/abkokfx-story.html (reporting that
public pension problems in Virginia remain despite the lack of unions); Elizabeth
G. Olson, Are Public Unions Our Convenient Economic Scapegoats?, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 28, 2011), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/211/2o/28/are-public-unions
-our-convenient-economic-scapegoats (blaming the economic downturn on
greed and illegal activity in the financial markets for public pension liabilities).
Compare Mary Williams Walsh, The Burden of Pensions on States, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. iO, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o11/o3/l/business/npension.html (not-
ing that collective bargaining does not appear to be the main factor driving pen-
sion costs higher in Wisconsin), with Robert M. Costrell, Oh, To Be a Teacher in
Wisconsin, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SBlooo0424o527487o34o86o457616429o717724956 (blaming collective bargaining
for the high cost of teacher fringe benefits).
244. Some states, like Texas, have never permitted collective bargaining in the public
sector. See Hylton, supra note 51, at 452-53 (noting that the prohibition did not
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should not invite controversy if banning bargaining would not help solve the
pension problem. As a political strategy, lawmakers could publicize their intent
to enact measures to weaken public sector unions regarding public pensions
(such as proposing to study this option) as a way of bringing more reticent and
unreasonable unions to the bargaining table. At least in some states, like Ohio,
the magnitude of the current crisis aligned divergent interests and kept public
pension plans afloat.2 5
3. Taxpayers
The political expediency of public pension promises should be resisted not
only through reform limiting such morally hazardous behavior, but also
through regulation targeting public passivity. Recall the tendency of politicians
to please voters, many of whom are government workers, by promising addi-
tional benefits and binding taxpayers to irresponsible commitments. In order to
make the financial effects of pension reform more salient, politicians should in-
form and enable taxpayers to participate in the provision of public pensions.
There is consensus among pension scholars across disciplines that increased
transparency and uniformity, along with more accurate discount and amortiza-
tion rates, should be included in any retirement reform package. 246 We address
each recommendation in turn.
a. Transparency
To begin, raising awareness is necessary for the public to understand and
evaluate the economic magnitude of state public pension liabilities. As stated
earlier, scholarly interest in public pension liabilities is a recent phenomenon
and coincides with a series of financial setbacks suffered by economies world-
wide. 7 Five years ago, we were part of a group of scholars that raised awareness
of a souring investment climate risking thousands of government workers' pen-
sions.2 At that time, we urged the adoption of mandatory disclosure laws to
stop morally hazardous behavior yet did make change easier to implement when
the state could no longer afford its retirement benefits).
245. See Sabrina Tavernise, Ohio Senate Passes Bill to Weaken Collective Bargaining
Clout of Public Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2o1/
03/03/us/o3states.html.
246. Hylton, supra note 79, at 471-72 (recommending reforms that "encourage taxpay-
ers to function like shareholders and others with a serious stake in the financial
health of a private enterprise").
247. Stephen P. D'Arcy et al., Optimal Funding of State Employee Pension Systems, 66 J.
RISK & INS. 345, 347 (1999) (comparing the volume of research done on private
pension funding with the lack of research on state pension funding).
248. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 316.
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identify funding issues and facilitate solutions. 49 As discussed below, such dis-
closures should be made to participants, beneficiaries, and the general public,
and include financial and actuarial information related to the plan. We stand by
that recommendation.
We agree, however, with Professor Beermann that transparency is not a
panacea because of psychological propensities to discount long-term problems,
especially when the overall share of liability is small.25 ° Further, because taxpay-
ers move from state to state, they may determine that they will not be held ac-
countable when obligations come due.251 Nonetheless, we believe that more
sunshine over the financial status of retirement plans is an integral part of an
overall solution to the public pension predicament. 52 At the very least, in-
creased transparency should make it easy for taxpayers to find information on
the financial condition of public pensions through required reporting on a
timely basis and made readily available on the internet.
249. See id. As discussed infra in Part III.A.3.b, we suggested the adoption of a uniform
law for the management of public employees' retirement systems. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Management of Public Employees Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) in 1997
to promote transparency and uniformity and, thereby, to permit public monitor-
ing. See id. at 329-30. As of 2014, however, only two states have adopted its disclo-
sure provisions. It is unclear why so few states have enacted such legislation. One
reason may be that governments with financially troubled pensions do not want
transparency. Cf. Paul M. Secunda, Litigating for the Future of Public Pensions in
the United States 56 (Marquette University Law School Legal Studies Research Pa-
per Series, Research Paper No. 14-19, May 2014) (on file with authors) (surmising
that UMPERSA has had such a low adoption rate "because the law is the classic
'political orphan,' with no interest group caring enough to overcome legislative
inertia").
250. Beermann, supra note 51, at 27.
251. See id.; see also Robert P. Inman, Public Employee Pensions and the Local Labor
Budget, 19 J. PUB. ECON. 49, 50 (1982) (arguing that mobile taxpayers are likely to
support deferring payment for current services until later at the expense of less
mobile residents).
252. See Costrell et al., supra note 203, at 65 (calling for transparency to defined benefit
plan participants); Reinke, supra note 64, at 17o6-07 (discussing the federal bill,
the Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, which requires pension plans to
file annual reports on funding levels and actuarial assumptions). Given the in-
creased demands of public accountability, state governments have begun to put
spending online. See Tracy Loew, States Put Spending Online, USA TODAY, Feb. 23,
2009, at 3A.
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b. Uniformity
Increased uniformity on key information will create progress on the prob-
lem of public pensions. The financial status of public pensions is difficult to dis-
cern, in part, because these funds vary widely with different sets of laws for each
system."' When and how liabilities are reported is subject to vagaries in each
state,254 and not all states publish current data.255
Different levels of requisite funding and different assumptions determining
liabilities further complicate comparisons of reported information among pub-
lic pension systems.256 These assumptions include demographics, assumed rates
of return on investments, other economic indicators, and information about
the plan.25 7 In retirement systems for teachers there are different actuarial
methods for calculating retirement benefits including age at entry, projected
unit credit, and aggregate cost.258 Assumed inflation rates range from 2.5% to
4.5% and assumed interest rates range from 7% to 8.5%.259 States can also con-
solidate their systems for purposes of reporting, or disclose the data separately
for each system within the state. Adopting the same criteria for reporting within
and between states would permit a complete comparison of each separate sys-
tem.
Previously, we highlighted this lack of uniformity as an obstacle to reform
and advocated the adoption of the Uniform Management of Public Employees
253. There are different vesting requirements, fiduciary standards, and reporting rules.
See generally CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PUBLIC PENSION PLANS: THE STATE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK (2d ed. 1993) (discussing various disclosure and reporting require-
ments in states). In a survey of state and local government pension funds by the
Government Finance Officers Association and the Public Pension Coordinating
Council, ninety percent had an annual report, but half of those systems distribut-
ed it only on demand. David Hess, Empirical Evidence on the Effect of Governance
Structures and Practices: Public Pension Fund Assets, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 191,
210 (2o6).
254. See BONAFEDE ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.
255. See id. (noting that even for those systems seeking to report in a timely manner, it
often takes six months to a year for actuaries to determine values). See generally id.
at 15.
256. See id.; see also Mitchell et al., supra note 26, at 23-25 (discussing various methods
used by actuaries to determine pension plan liabilities).
257. NEA Collective Bargaining & Member Advocacy, Characteristics of Large Public
Education Pension Plans, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N 60, 63, 69-73 (2010), http://
www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/CharacteristicsLargePubEdPensionPlans2oO.pdf.
258. See id. at 69-70; see also Karen Eilers Lahey et al., Retirement Plans for College Fac-
ulty at Public Institutions, 17 FIN. SERv. REV. 323-41 (2008) (evaluating the risk and
return of defined benefit and defined contribution plans of the largest four-year
public institutions of higher education in all fifty states).
259. NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 257, at 74-80 tbl.7.
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Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) or minimum universal disclosure rules
akin to it.26 We do so again now.
UMPERSA requires three kinds of reports to be produced and distributed
by each retirement system: a summary plan description; an annual report; and
an annual disclosure of financial and actuarial status. 6 ' The summary plan de-
scription provides an explanation of the retirement program and its benefits. 62
The annual report must contain specific financial and actuarial information.26 3
Both must be distributed to plan participants and beneficiaries and made avail-
able to the public.26 4 The annual disclosure of financial and actuarial status is a
more detailed compilation of the retirement system and its financial position. 6
The disclosure need not be published,266 but must be available at the principal
office of the system and at a central repository where reports of all systems in a
state are filed.26
7
260. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 329-31; see also Unif. Mgmt. of Pub. Em-
ployee Ret. Sys. Act, 7A U.L.A. 336 (1997), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/management-public-employee-retirement systems/mpersa-amdraft_
approved.ju197.pdf. For a summary of the Act by one of its reporters, see general-
ly Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Em-
ployee Retirement Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141 (1998). For similar sugges-
tions, see generally Daniel J. Kaspar, Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving
Toward a More Transparent Accounting of State Public Employee Pension Plans, 3
W. & M. POL'Y REV. 129 (2011) (proposing federal legislation that requires states to
adopt a uniform standard for the reporting and valuation of pension funding);
Richard E. Mendales, Federalism and Fiduciaries: A New Framework for Protecting
State Benefit Funds, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 503, 521 (2013) (urging pension reform of
state and local benefit plans via the adoption of a uniform state code that is more
comprehensive than the one proposed in UMPERSA).
261. Sections thirteen through eighteen address the reporting and disclosure require-
ments of the Act. Unif. Mgmt. of Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. Act, §§ 13-18, 7A pt.3
U.L.A. 75-85 (2006). UMPERSA also establishes standards of fiduciary conduct.
See Willborn, supra note 260, at 141.
262. See Unif. Mgmt. of Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. Act § 16.
263. See id. For the specific kinds of disclosures we recommended, see the discussion,
infra, at Part IlI.A.3.b.
264. See id. § 13(b)(2)-(3); see also id. § 14(a)(1)-(3). The annual report is subject the
same wide distribution requirements as the summary plan description. See id. §§
13(b)(5), 14(a)(4).
265. See id. § 17.
266. See id. §§ 13(b), 14.
267. See id. § 18.
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Thus far, only Wyoming 68 and Maryland269 have adopted the substance of
the uniform law. More states should consider it to ensure clear and complete
information to those monitoring the system and to create political incentives
for leaders addressing pension difficulties. As evidenced by our statistical analy-
sis in Part I, adoption of a uniform pension law would be especially opportune
for those states' pensions whose members face sizable exposure to the loss of
retirement income by not contributing to Social Security.
c. Accuracy
Last but not least is improved accuracy. Current reporting methods under-
state taxpayer liability. For instance, a recent report revealed that while states
had forty-eight cents of each dollar promised to current and future retirees in
2011, they reported having seventy-four cents of each dollar owed to retirees.
17
'
These misrepresentations of the magnitude of fiscal stress are frequently credit-
ed as contributing to the imminent demise of many public pension plans.
72
The private sector may be the best reference for fixing flawed actuarial
methods and practices . 73 Valuing pension liabilities according to the likelihood
268. Wyoming became the first state to adopt the Uniform Management of Public
Employees Retirement Systems Act on February 25, 2005. Lahey & Anenson, supra
note 14, at 33o n.153. The law became effective July 1, 20o6. Id.
269. Maryland adopted UMPERSA after its pension fund management was subject to
public scrutiny. See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Jon Morgan, Md. Pension Trustees Are
Often Absent, BALT. SUN, Nov. i8, 20o, at iB; Jon Morgan et al., Questions Abound
in Pension's Fiscal Skid, BALT. SUN, Nov. 15, 20O1, at iA.
270. For a summary of the Act, see, Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems
Act Summary, NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAwS (2014),
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Management%200f%2oPublic%
2oEmployee%2oRetirement%2oSystems%2oAct. The South Carolina legislature
incorporated the fiduciary portions of UMPERSA into its Code in 1998. W. SCOTT
SIMON, THE PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING 209 (2002).
271. Michael A. Fletcher, State Pensions Face Larger-Than- Usual Funding Gap, Moody's
Report Says, WASH. POST, June 27, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013
-o6-27/business/4023356_a-pension-liabiities-pension-promises-pension-fund.
272. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 43. See generally J. Fred Giertz & Leslie E. Papke,
Public Pension Plans: Myths and Realities for State Budgets, 6o NAT. TAX J. 305, 305-
23 (2007) (finding evidence that assumptions are manipulated in order to lower
the necessary contributions to the pension plans).
273. Norcross & Biggs, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that "economists almost universally
agree" that private sector accounting methods are more appropriate than current
public sector assumptions in calculating pension liabilities). They explain that
"[c]urrent public sector pension accounting rules effectively violate wen-accepted
economic precepts such as the Modigliani-Miller results in corporate finance, the




of payment, rather than the return expected on pension assets, is one possible
correction.27 4 This would force state sponsors to disclose the true cost of their
future pension commitments, and should be considered a first step in enabling
reformY 5 Economists agree that the discount rate on the riskiness of the payout
should be about half what states typically designate; that is, around four percent
rather than the inflated eight percent used by many states7 6 With an arguably
274. See, e.g., Barro & Buck, supra note 6, at 5-6; Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 11, at
1211 (asserting that the appropriate discount rate to calculate liabilities should re-
flect risk from a taxpayer perspective rather than the expected rate of return on
pension assets as stipulated by government accounting rules). For an explanation
of the two competing theories-market and actuarial-for accurate valuation of
state pension plans, see Kaspar, supra note 260, at 12-16.
In addition to choosing a rate at which to discount the future payments from
accrued benefits, the amortization period is another important variable in calcu-
lating pension debt. Longer periods show smaller present values versus shorter
periods, which yield larger values. Despite an aging workforce, public pensions
amortize over thirty years as compared to private pensions that use a fifteen-year
period. See Hylton, supra note 51, at 432 (arguing that governments "cannot justi-
fy the use of a thirty-year period because the number of years until retirement is
not that long in most cases"); Norcross & Biggs, supra note 6, at 1; M. Barton War-
ing, Liability-Relative Investing, 30 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 8-20 (2004) (finding that
the mid-point of a public pension's stream of future benefit payments is around
fifteen years in the future and, accordingly, a lump sum payment in fifteen years
can be treated as the annual benefit liabilities owed by a plan).
275. See Beerman, supra note 43, at 35. The public sector accounting standards set by
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 45 are incomplete in so
far as they allow states to set their own discount rate. Hylton, supra note 51, at
423-30 (noting that GASB 45 mimicked Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) 1O6 in the private sector and drew attention to the present value of the
level of benefits promised, but failed to specify a discount rate); see also Other
Postemployment Benefits: A Plain-Language Summary of GASB Statements No. 43
and No. 45, GOv'T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (2004), http://www.gasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=
1175820457538&blobheader=application%2Fpdf [hereinafter GASB Statements].
States need not follow the standards in the first place. Texas went so far as to
block their implementation by statute. Hytlon, supra note 51, at 442.
276. Barro & Buck, supra note 6, at 5; see also Norcross & Biggs, supra note 6, at i n.1
(applying a discount rate of 3.5%, the yield on Treasury bonds with a maturity of
fifteen years as of May 27, 2010); Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 11, at 1217-18,
1246 (noting that states use an eight percent discount rate). Under a market value
of liability theory, however, states like Texas may legitimately use a different
(higher) discount rate since the promised payout is not guaranteed and may re-
duce benefits at any time. California, based on current case law backing benefits
under the Constitution, should apply the risk-free rate. See Going for Broke: Re-
forming California's Public Employee Pension Systems, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON.
POLICY RESEARCH 2 (2010), http://siepr.stanford.edu/system/fdes/shared/
GoingforBroke pb.pdf.
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correct rate, unfunded liabilities for public sector pensions more than triples
from $i trillion to over $3 trillion. 77 For individual states, a market-based dis-
count rate can raise unfunded debt obligations even more. In New Jersey, for
example, Eileen Norcross and Andrew Biggs calculated liabilities to be $173.9
billion rather than $44.7 billion as reported by the state.27 s Similarly, a 2010
Stanford study found California pension plans to have unfunded liabilities sev-
eral times larger than reported.2 79 Whether or not the truth will set states free, it
will at least provide government sponsors (and, by extension, taxpayers) a bet-
ter idea of the fiscal challenges they are facing." °
Accordingly, the lack of transparency and uniformity, in addition to inac-
curate actuarial methods and practices, has exacerbated the widespread moral
hazard problem inherent in public pensions. Fixing these faults is an important
part of the remedy.
B. Modifying Existing Plans or Plan Structure
State pension deficits are at an all-time high." The kind and magnitude of
change needed to reduce pensions costs vary between states due to differences
in benefit levels, size of unfunded pension liabilities, and levels of effort by
states to make contributions in the past. Significantly, the chronic failure of
pension plan sponsors to pay required contributions now requires even more
contributions by states and benefactors to make up the differences."2 States will
typically not assume any new fiscal commitments concerning their pensions,
but rather attempt to cut costs. Certain measures may treat similarly situated
workers differently, fail to provide adequate levels of support at retirement, and
277. Barro & Buck, supra note 6, at 5.
278. Norcross & Biggs, supra note 6, at 2 (recalculating New Jersey's unfunded benefit
obligation using private sector accounting methods to be $173.9 billion rather than
$44.7 billion, when liabilities are discounted at the 8.25% annual return that New
Jersey predicts it can achieve on the funds' investment portfolios).
279. STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 276 (studying the three
largest pension plans and applying a risk-free rate of 4.14% rather than rate of re-
turn assumptions of 8%, 7.75%, and 7.5%).
28o. See, e.g., Kaspar, supra note 260, at 2, 19; see also Hylton, supra note 51, at 418-23
(explaining that many private sector companies made sizable changes to plans
and were able to reduce costs after being forced by the FASB in 1993 to confront
the true cost of their pensions).
281. Elman & Merrett, supra note 73, at 367-69 (providing statistics on funding level
declines). Recent data from the Bureau of Labor of Statistics show that public
pension obligations account for almost seventeen percent of all public debt in the
United States. Yet, for states as a whole, it is less than one percent of total spend-
ing. NAT'LASS'N ST. RETIREMENTADMINS., supra note i, at 3.
282. NAT'L ASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., supra note i, at ', 3.
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pose different degrees of litigation risk and expense.28 3 Reforms are also likely to
have long term labor market effects. Since deferred compensation by way of
pension benefits is a recruitment and retention tool for government service,2
8 4
the amount and other attributes of government-sponsored pensions may de-
termine who enters public service and how long they stay."8
As indicated previously, there is tremendous variation among educator de-
fined benefit plans. The following discussion takes a holistic view of these public
pensions and offers a variety of reform possibilities. Such reforms span a spec-
trum of modest modifications to major changes in plan structure. We also sug-
gest that lawmakers contemplate additional protections, like adding federal So-
cial Security and establishing a similar state entity for private pensions in case of
insolvency.
1. Defined Benefit Plan Changes
State government employers fund defined benefit plans through a combi-
nation of employer and employee contributions, and investment returns on al-
ready-accumulated assets that have accrued over a long period of time. 86 Since
fund investments have failed to produce the return needed to make the prom-
ised payments, contributions must increase, benefits must decrease, or both.
To increase incoming funds, states could raise employee contributions.28 7
This solution may actually be more difficult to enact in non-Social Security
states since employees already pay on average three percent more in contribu-
tions than Social Security states.Y8 As analyzed in Part II.A, however, Colorado,
Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas accomplished increased member contributions to
teacher plans.
To decrease costs, states can change benefit calculations by capping salaries
or altering the number of years with which to determine the final average salary.
The majority of non-Social Security states made such changes to the calculation
283. See discussion supra Part II.B.
284. Costrell et al., supra note 203, at 69; Deborah Kemp, Public Pension Plans: The
Need for Federal Regulation, lo HAMLINE L. REV. 27 (1987) ("The impetus for this
expansion [of public pensions] is the need to induce individuals to accept lower
paying government employment over jobs in private industry."). Maine, for in-
stance, created its retirement system to encourage "qualified persons to seek pub-
lic employment and to continue in public employment during their productive
years." 5 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17050 (1989).
285. Monahan, supra note 68, at 617.
286. Employer contributions account for twenty-six percent, employee contributions
thirteen percent, with investment returns making up the remaining amount.
NAT'L ASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., supra note 1, at 2 (employees contribute
four to eight percent of their pay to retirement).
287. Id.
288. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
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of retirement benefits s9 States should eliminate loopholes like double-dipping
and pension spiking as has been done in California and other states.2 90 Raising
the retirement age saves on future costs, 29' and with retirees expected to live
four more years than retirees in 1950, it makes sense to adjust for this higher age
expectancy.2 92
An even more attractive option is to cut COLAs and thus pass some of the
inflation or investment risk to employees. 93 While reducing benefits for new
hires and current employees lowers future pension costs, COLA payments are
based on benefits that are being paid.294 This means that cutting COLAs actually
reduces existing unfunded liability.295 An investment-based adjustment can be
made by correlating COLAs with the performance of investment returns.29
6
Wisconsin's pension system is a good example of this type of risk sharing.
97
The legislature in Wisconsin created a process for COLAs that works by provid-
ing a dividend if the investment returns are positive in a given year and reduces
pensions if the system has a poor investment return9 8
Colorado's COLA cuts also represent a risk-sharing arrangement. The state
eliminated the fixed guarantee and tied the COLA to investment returns and
inflation. 99 Unlike Illinois, Connecticut, and Kentucky, which simply reduced
the guaranteed amount, Ohio linked COLAs to changes in inflation for its non-
teacher plans." Maine and Connecticut, on the other hand, lowered the cap on
the existing inflation adjustment.3 ' Linking COLAs to inflation makes sense for
289. See discussion supra Part II.A.
290. See id.; Hylton, supra note 51, at 422 (noting that some states encouraged employ-
ees to use up saved vacation and over-time during their last year of employment
in order to inflate their income; the state would then pay ninety percent of this
"final salary"-an amount often greater than the retiree's true base pay). For re-
cent litigation from Illinois and Texas over the removal of spiking, see Buck, supra
note 146, at 18, 40.
291. PEW CHARITABLE TR., supra note 11; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
292. Id. at 31.
293. Id. at io.
294. Munnell et al., supra note 58, at 2.
295. Id.
296. PEW CHARITABLE TR., supra note 11.
297. Id.
298. Id. The only guarantee is the base benefit. Id.
299. Munnell et al., supra note 58, at 3. Missouri also ties the COLA to inflation. Ken-
tucky has a performance-based COLA with certain guarantees only if the COLA is
loo% funded. See NAT'L ASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., supra note 1.
300. Munnell et al., supra note 58, at 4.
301. See id. at 3-4.
33:1 2014
REFORMING PUBLIC PENSIONS
states that had fixed guarantees,3"2 since low inflations rates for the past several
years caused adjustments that exceed inflation to increase real retirement bene-
fits. Providing for or lowering the cap on COLAs is also appropriate in these
difficult financial times: while maintaining the value of benefits for retirees is
important, state economies are not likely able to afford full inflation protection.
Additionally, legislatures in Illinois and Maine attempted equity in their COLA
reductions by giving retirees with higher benefits more of the inflation risk.
3 3
As explained in Part II.A, nine of the thirteen non-Social Security states
made changes to their COLAs, the majority of which applied to existing em-
ployees and/or retirees. As further detailed in Part 1I.B, the COLA changes have
been challenged in three states with mixed results, although some of the cases
have not concluded. Assessing litigation across the states where COLA reforms
largely withstood challenge, however, suggests that COLA changes are a legal
possibility that may be worth the cost of litigation.30
4
2. Alternative Benefit Plans
Rather than restraining pension growth through modification of existing
plans (and in lieu of a federal rescue), states could change plan structure. In the
past several years, we have seen the erosion of government guaranteed benefits
and the implementation of 401(k) style or hybrid plans. 5
The defined contribution plan, not to be confused with a defined benefit
plan, eliminates the potential for persistently underfunded plans that risk col-
lapse." 6 Employer and employee contributions would be used solely to generate
savings for employees. In contrast, governments sponsoring a defined benefit
plan pay a particular level of benefit that may have no relationship to what em-
302. See NAT'L ASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., supra note 1, at 2-3 (listing common
COLA types and features).
303. See id. at 4.
304. See id. (assessing litigation where COLA cuts withstood challenge in eight of nine
states and concluding that "legal hurdles to cutting COLAs appear to be quite
low"); see also id. (noting that a lawsuit has been filed in the non-Social Security
state of Illinois but that no decision has been reached).
305. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 323 (explaining that the federal government
adopted the defined contribution plan solution in 1986 and now has half of its
workers enrolled which relieves the federal retirement system of the unfunded
pension liabilities facing state and local governments); Dan Van Bogaert, Solving
The Public Pension Plan Dilemma, 19 J. PENSION BENEFITS: ISSUES IN ADM IN. 37, 37-
46 (2012) (comparing status of government-sponsored pension systems relative to
the private sector and analyzing different points of view regarding public pension
reform).
306. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 321-25 (discussing the defined contribution
plan option). For more discussion between choice of plan, see generally Jonathan
Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 187.
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ployees contributed. Economists Michael Podgursky and Robert Costrell argue
this is the fundamental flaw in defined benefit design, and argue that alternative
plans will close the gap between contributions and pension wealth by tying ben-
efits to contributions.3"7
The defined contribution plan has the economic advantage for government
employers of removing responsibility for underfunded or underperforming
fund assets." 8 At the same time, however, the prospect of employees completely
bearing the risk of their retirement raises concerns.30 9 Current account balances
of these plans in the private sector show that low and moderate wage earners
lack adequate income for retirement.30 Teachers, whose salaries are usually
modest, and are declining relative to the private sector and other public sector
workers, are particularly at risk.3 ' Nevertheless, the defined contribution plan
could be modified in a way that provides a federal guarantee to help ensure that
workers have adequate income at retirement.31
States changing pension plan structure will likely leave in place existing de-
fined benefit plans and instead target new hires because of legal concerns, giving
rise to two tiers of employees and corresponding concerns regarding fairness.
Illinois, California, and some other states are in a situation where young educa-
tors may not be getting their fair share of the retirement pie.313 Equity concerns
307. Robert M. Costrell, "GASB Won't Let Me": A False Objection to Pension Reform,
LJAF POLICY PERSPECTIVE (2012), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/img/LJAF-
Policy-Perspective-GASB-Wont -Let-Me.pdf (arguing that plans should tie bene-
fits to contributions).
308. See Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 318-25.
309. See id. at 323; see also Dana M. Muir & John A. Turner, Imagining the Ideal U.S.
Pension System, in IMAGINING THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 19, 38-41 (Dana M. Muir & John A. Turner eds., 2011) (discussing
policies that might reverse the decline in defined benefit plans in the private sec-
tor).
310. Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Pension Coverage and Retirement Security,
CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT Bos. COLL. (Dec. 2009), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/20o9/12/IB_9-26.pdf.
311. Id.
312. For a discussion of providing a federal guarantee for defined contribution plans in
the private sector, see generally THERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I'M SIXTY-FOUR:
THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM (2008); Regina T. Jef-
ferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607,
640-41 (2000); see also Hylton, supra note 51, at 468 (advocating the adoption of a
Federal Thrift Savings Plan, a special defined contribution plan available to feder-
al employees and members of the uniformed services).
313. Costrell et al., supra note 203, at 65. In New York, Pennsylvania, and Alabama,
new hires will receive ten to twenty percent less in retirement than current work-
ers. See Melanie Hicken, Firefighters, Teachers Face Smaller Retirement Safety Net,




can be minimized to some extent by allowing employees a choice of plans.31 4
Many states, such as Ohio and Colorado, offer the option of either a defined
contribution plan or a defined benefit plan to its new employees. 35 Employee
opinion polls indicate a preference for defined benefit plans, while studies show
that these plans inhibit mobility and harm employees who move out of state .316
Defined benefit plans incentivize employees to stay with one employer because
employees earn more retirement benefits later in their careers.3 17 In contrast, de-
fined contribution plans are portable and not tied to the employer, eliminating
the penalty for mobility.3 s
Along with assessing employee adequacy and equity concerns associated
with changing plan structure, state governments should assess efficiency issues.
Alternative plans appear to be more efficient because they reduce the risk of fu-
ture defined benefit pension deficits.319 However, switching to less-popular de-
fined contribution plans may further imperil defined benefit pensions since
there will be less active members to fund already existing pensions.
320
Additionally, there is disagreement among economists over whether elimi-
nating defined benefit plans will cause turnover. Increased turnover is an im-
portant consideration because it both raises costs due to the recruitment and
training of new hires and lowers teacher effectiveness. 321 Professor Christian
Weller explains that public sector employers, unlike those in the private sector,
are not able to offset the switch in plans to retain workers through stock options
and grants, making the risk of turnover particularly acute.
32
Moreover, defined contribution plans typically have higher investment and
administrative costs because defined benefit plans are free from regulation. 323
314. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 15, at 325.
315. See id.; Alicia H. Munnell et al., Why Have Some States Introduced Defined Contri-
bution Plans, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT Bos. COLL. (2008). Other states
include North Dakota, Washington, Montana, Florida, and South Carolina. Id.
California and Maine also offer the defined contribution plan option to employ-
ees, but only as a supplemental plan. Id.
316. See Frederick M. Hess & Juliet P. Squire, The False Promise of Public Pensions, 158
POL'Y REV. 75-85 (2009-2010) (discussing outmoded paradigm of teaching as a
profession that is not in a mobile workforce); Robert M. Costrell & Michael
Podgursky, Golden Handcuffs, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 2010, at 61.
317. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 318-19.
318. Id.
319. Costrell & Podgursky, supra note 316, at 62.
320. We are assuming there is not a corresponding increase in contributions.
321. See Christian E. Weller, Buyer Beware: The Risks to Teacher Effectiveness from
Changing Retirement Benejits, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2011), http://cdn
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/o1/o9/pdf/buyer-beware.pdf.
322. Costell et al., supra note 203, at 67.
323. Munnell et al., supra note 58.
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The weighted average administrative cost for defined benefit plans is only 0.34%
of assets, but as the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund learned, replacing de-
fined benefit plans with defined contribution plans could increase costs to more
than 2.25%.? 4 Alaska, which abandoned the defined benefit plan and offered
only the defined contribution plan to state employees in 2005, is now attempt-
ing to return to its former plan structure.325
The comparatively high management costs of defined contribution plans,
however, may decrease with the size of the plan and, in any event, may be nom-
inal compared to the cost of operating underfunded defined benefit plans. In
fact, a recent study of teacher pensions by Costrell and Podgursky indicate that
defined benefit plans may be more costly.326 Comparing the pension costs of
private sector professionals (who are nearly all in defined contribution plans)
and public sector professionals (who are predominately in defined benefit
plans), the study concluded that the latter costs are higher and rising.32 7 Using
time series data from 2004 to 2013, they report the cost gap has increased from
1.9% to 6.4% of salary.3 8 Private sector pension expenses, in contrast, remained
relatively stable.329
Cash balance plans, a type of hybrid plan now popular in the private sector,
lower net costs more than defined contribution plans and have asset-liability
matching strategies that effectively neutralize volatility. 33° Transition and turno-
324. Annual State and Local Government Employee-Retirement Systems Survey, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2006), https://www.census.gov/govs/retire.
325. Costrell et al., supra note 203, at 68 (discussing Alaska's consideration of return-
ing to the defined benefit plan and West Virginia which did in fact return to the
defined benefit plan); see also PEw RESEARCH TR., supra note 11.
326. Costrell & Podgursky, supra note 316.
327. Id.
328. Id. (showing that the school costs have climbed from 11.9% of salaries in 2004 to
14.6% in 2008, to 17.0% in 2013).
329. Id. (explaining that the private sector costs are relatively stable at around 10.5% of
salaries).
330. Richard J. Bottelli, Jr. & Zorast Wadia, Cash Balance Renaissance, 26 BENEFITS Q.
25, 26-28 (2010). Cash balance plans combine the features of the defined benefit
and contribution plans. T. Leigh Anenson & Karen Eilers Lahey, The Crisis in Cor-
porate America: Private Pension Liability and Proposals for Reform, 9 U. PENN. J.
LABOR & EMP. L. 495, 502-03 (2007). Cash balance plans are similar to defined con-
tribution plans because they create hypothetical accounts for employees based on
their contributions at a specified rate of interest. Id. at 502. Notwithstanding these
similarities, cash balance plans differ from defined contribution plans because the
employer bears the investment risk and guarantees a particular benefit at retire-
ment. Id. These features of cash balance plans are similar to defined benefit plans.
Id. In the cash balance scenario, however, if the account earns more interest on
the funds, the employer keeps the excess. Id. If the account earns less interest, the
employee is still assured an amount at the specified interest rate. Id.
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ver costs, however, will likely increase as they do for defined contribution
plans.33 ' But adequacy concerns are more favorable because employees receive a
guaranteed return, although payments are still largely determined by the per-
formance of invested contributions instead of a percentage of the employee's
final salary.332 While the pension benefit is lower than it would be with a defined
benefit plan, employees do not have to manage the investment risk as they
would under a defined contribution plan.333 Notwithstanding the warnings of
actuaries, who fear that state employees who lack Social Security benefits will
become "ward[s] of the state," Louisiana began offering the cash balance plan
option for new hires effective July 1, 2012.11
4
Another type of pension option may be on the horizon with the assistance
of Congress. The proposed Secure Annuities for Employee (SAFE) Retirement
Act of 2013 is designed to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide
for reform of public pension plans. 3 It retains the defined benefit model but
shifts management to an insurance company. The new proposal would elimi-
nate the accounting and moral hazard problems in the current system, transfer-
ring public pension risk to private insurers. More specifically, the SAFE plan
would purchase a deferred annuity contract from a private insurer that covers
employees' benefits earned in each year's accrual. 3 6 Because the contracts
331. Costrell and McGee, however, conclude that net turnover would not increase.
Robert M. Costrell & Joshua B. McGee, Teacher Pension Incentives, Retirement Be-
havior, and Potential for Reform in Arkansas, 5 EDuc. FIN. & POL'Y 492, 514-16
(2010). Turnover would rise for middle-aged workers, but fall for younger and
older workers. See id.
332. Id.
333. Costrell et al., supra note 203, at 64 (favoring the conversion of educator defined
benefit pensions to cash balance plans). Cash balance plans also have more lim-
ited death and disability benefits. Hicken, supra note 313, at 2 (discussing Louisi-
ana's switch to a cash balance pension plan and its effect on employees who be-
come disabled or family members of employees who die before reaching the
retirement age).
334. Louisiana's new cash balance plan was ruled unconstitutional by a trial judge for
not receiving the requisite vote of the state legislature. Hicken, supra note 313, at 2.
The decision was appealed. Id.
335. See Hatch Unveils Bill to Overhaul Pension Benefit System, Secure Retirement Sav-
ings, supra note 3 (discussing S.B.1270). For a recent proposal from the academic
community, see generally Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine
Pensions: A Solution to the State and Local Pension Underfunding Crisis, 163 U.
PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393152 or http://
dx.doi.org/o.2139/ssrn.2393152 (arguing for a new type of "tontine" pension and
showing how a model tontine pension could be used to replace a large traditional
pension plan like the California State Teachers' Retirement System).
336. Jennifer Sorensen Senta, SAFE Retirement Act: New Proposal Would Transfer Pulic
Pension Risk to Private Insurers, RETIRMENT TowN HALL (July 24, 2013), http://
www.retirementtownhall.com/?p=5174.
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would be purchased each year of service, the annual accumulated benefit would
be fully funded and transfer the risk from both the employee and the govern-
ment.337 After purchase of the contract, the private insurer would bear the in-
vestment and longevity risk.3"' However, the new structure is not foolproof,
since state regulations do not guarantee against insurer bankruptcy.33 9 Defined
benefit plan costs may also increase given insurers' more stringent capital re-
quirements. 3 4
°
Whether state governments should shift all or part of the retirement risk to
their employees by implementing alternative plans is a value-laden question
and one that requires the resolution of disputed assumptions. Given differences
across the thirteen teacher plans in the non-Social Security states, we do not
take a position on the appropriate plan amendment or redesign for each state.
Our thesis is that, despite their heavy debt burden, governments have choices in
attempting to right-size their budgets and constrain the growth of benefits
costs. In choosing, they should remember that pension plans have micro and
macroeconomic effects. 34' Retirement planning is not only important for the
financial security of public employees, but a key component of the national
economy.34 We emphasize that plan changes have legal effects that may limit
reforms to new hires, particularly for teacher pensions that do not fund Social
Security. As considered in Part II.B.3, changes to these plans may be more diffi-




339. Id. (quoting Hank Kim, the executive director of the National Conference on
Public Employees Retirement Systems, say that "there are a slew of private insur-
ance companies that have gone bankrupt").
340. Id.
341. Jacob S. Hacker, Restoring Retirement Security: The Market Crisis, the "Great Risk
Shift," and the Challenge for Our Nation, 19 ELDER L.J. 1 (2011) (concluding that se-
curity in employer-sponsored public plans has even broader implications for
states individually and for our country as a whole).
342. NAT'L ASS'N ST. RETIREMENT ADMINS., supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that more
than 20o billion dollars are paid annually from pension funds to public retirees
and their beneficiaries across the United States). But see Andrew G. Biggs, Public
Pension Stimulus Nonsense, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (May 3, 2012), http://www
.aei.org/article/economics/fiscal-policy/labor/public-pension-stimulus-nonsense
(calling the argument an economic fallacy and explaining that if pensions were




C. Supplementing Benefits with Social Security
Those concerned with the insolvency of pension plans should consider
supplementing pension benefits with Social Security benefits. Social Security is
the largest federal social program. a43 Established in 1935, the Social Security Sys-
tem3 " provides lifetime retirement benefits and benefits for disability, survivor-
ship, and death. 345 Most retired workers depend on Social Security benefits as
their primary source of income.346 Together with pensions and personal savings,
it is a critical component of old-age income security.3 47
Today, Social Security coverage is almost universal, protecting ninety-four
percent of all workers.148 The remaining non-covered workers consist of public
employees, including members of the thirteen state teacher retirement systems
emphasized in this Article. Social Security benefits would provide a safety net to
thousands of teachers and help prevent gaps in coverage that adversely affect
work, such as disability.3 49 Moreover, unlike state plans, Social Security is trans-
ferable as workers move from job to job and in and out of public employ-
ment.35 ° While the future of this social insurance program remains uncertain,35'
providing coverage for employees as long as it is viable is still worthwhile.
343. Dorothy A. Brown et al., Social Security Reform: Risks, Returns, and Race, 9
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 633, 633 (2000).
344. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (20o6)). The Social Security Act of 1935 was created "to
provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age bene-
fits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate provision for aged
persons." Id.
345. Id. To receive the lifetime retirement benefits a worker must have forty credits of
covered work and can begin receiving the benefits at age sixty-two. Id.
346. Brown et al., supra note 343, at 633.
347. Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on Retirement, 12
ELDER L.J. 245 (2000) (discussing pensions, personal savings, and Social Security,
as the "three legged stool" of retirement).
348. Nuschler et al., supra note 19; see also infra Appendix, Table i.
349. Simply adding Social Security coverage would not necessarily provide better bene-
fit protections than what is already provided by the state. The effect of adding
coverage would depend on exactly how state and local governments modify their
existing plans to allow this extra coverage. Nuschler et al., supra note 19, at 1o.
350. Id. In 1983, Congress amended the Social Security Act to eliminate the windfall
that occurred under the previous law which allowed a person to collect Social Se-
curity earned from a previous job in addition to collecting his or her pension ben-
efits from public employment. Windfall Elimination Provision, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, SSA PUB. No. 05-10045 (2012), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/loo45
.html; Teachers and Social Security, CONN. GEN. AsSEMB. REP., (Sept. 7, 2006),
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2oo6/rpt/2o6-R-o547.htm.
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
However, for states and their employees, Social Security coverage comes at
a cost that could be significant because many pension plans are struggling fi-
nancially.352 Social Security is primarily funded by a payroll tax353 that requires
employers and employees to each contribute 6.2% of the first $117,000 of em-
ployee's annual salary in a timely fashion.354 As discussed in Part III.A.i, many
states have occasionally skipped required payments to their state teachers' de-
fined benefit plans because legislatures decided to save money and push the
payments into the future. If the contributions required by Social Security were
added to the current contribution rates, it would create a substantial expense
for both the employers and employees. 55
Given (or in spite of) the present economic climate and the massive scope
of public sector benefits-driven indebtedness, states may determine that the
benefits of inclusion outweigh the costs. For example, Maine recently proposed
making Social Security available to all state employees, including teachers.356
351. See Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Social Security Earnings and Projected Benefits, in
FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 327 (Olivia S. Mitchell
et al., eds., 2000) (showing the uncertainty of future benefits under the Social Se-
curity System). Changes to Social Security seem inevitable, which has inspired a
lively debate. See generally PETER A. DIAMOND & PETER R. ORSZAG, SAVING SOCIAL
SECURITY: A BALANCED APPROACH (2004); Peter Diamond, Reforming Public Pen-
sions in the US and the UK, 116 ECON. J. F94-Fii8 (2006) (describing the political
debate on reforming Social Security in the U.S.); Benjamin A. Templin, Full
Funding: The Future of Social Security, 22 J. L. & POL. 395 (2006) (discussing the
reasons behind the Social Security funding crisis); Justin Zimmerman, Incentiviz-
ing Work at Older Ages: The Need for Social Security Reforms, 19 ELDER L.J. 485
(2012).
352. Teachers and Social Security, supra note 350 ("The extent of cost increases would
depend on how states and localities adjust their existing pension plans in response
to mandatory Social Security coverage.").
353. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3101-3201 (2012). It was also de-
signed as protection against socially recognizable conditions, including poverty,
old age, and disability. See Brief History of Public Pensions in the United States and
Kansas, KAN. LEG. RES. DEP'T (Sept. 16, 2011), http://kslegislature.org/klrd.
354. The percentage of taxable income data is for 2014. See, Benefits Planner: Maximum
Taxable Earnings, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2015), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/
planners/maxtax.htm.
355. It is likely that the state would redesign the plan to offset some of the benefits of
adding Social Security with the contribution rates.
356. Maine created a task force that generated a report in 2010. Task Force Study and
Report: Maine State Employee and Teacher Unified Retirement Plan, ME. UNIFIED
RET. PLAN TASK FORCE (2010), http://www.mainepers.org/PDFs/other
%o2publications/MainePERS%2oFinal%2oURP%2oTask%2oForce%2oReport%2o 3
-9-20lo.pdf; see also Hylton, supra note 51, at 442 (noting that the pension short-




The proposal includes a phase-in period and would eliminate additional stress
on its pension fund.357 States that choose to add Social Security coverage do so
by voluntary agreement, known as a "Section 218 Agreement," ' between the
Social Security Administration and the state.35 9 Such agreements coordinating
retiree pension costs with Social Security differ from state to state. Certain
groups may be covered while others are not, depending on how states make the
arrangements. 36 °
The terms of admission require the state to hold a referendum requiring a
majority vote among pension plan members.36 ' States may alternatively opt to
divide employees under the same pension plan into groups, with those in favor
of joining doing so and those against not.362 Once coverage is provided, it can-
not be terminated, 36 3 and all future employees of that group are required to par-
ticipate in Social Security.364 The federal government could mandate that all
public pensions must contribute to Social Security to help the solvency of both
357. See Hylton, supra note 51, at 442 n.104 ("Maine will have to come up with a con-
siderable sum to sustain its existing pension plan, presumably through some
combination of taxes and service cuts."); Mary Williams Walsh, Maine Giving So-
cial Security Another Look, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/07/21/business/economy/21states.html.
358. 42 U.S.C. § 418 (2012).
359. Nuschler et al., supra note 19, at i.
360. 42 U.S.C. § 418. "Section 218 Agreements" cover positions not individuals. Public
employees are brought under a Section 218 Agreement in groups known as cover-
age groups. Id.
361. 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(3). Effective 1955, federal legislation allowed public employees
who already had public pensions to elect Social Security coverage through "Sec-
tion 218 Agreements" by conducting employee referendums. Nuschler et al., supra
note 19, at 2. There have been proposals involving extending mandatory Social
Security coverage to all newly hired public employees. Id. at 5. This is in response
to projected Social Security shortfalls. Id.
362. Id. at 2 ("[Almendments in 1956 permitted certain states to split state or local re-
tirement systems into 'divided retirement systems' based on groups of employees
that voted for Social Security coverage and groups of employees that voted against
Social Security coverage. Currently 23 states are authorized to operate a divided
retirement system.").
363. Id. This law was challenged in California in Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to So-
cial Security Entrapments, 477 U.S. 41 (1986). The Supreme Court rejected Califor-
nia's arguments and upheld the law. Id.
364. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65. Some state re-
tirement systems have placed bans on social security coverage and have prohibited
members from holding another referendum, such as Connecticut Teachers' Re-
tirement System. See, e.g., Teachers and Social Security, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. REP.,
(Sept. 7, 20o6), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2oo6/rpt/2oo6-R-o547.htm.
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Social Security and public pensions.6 ' Universal coverage would improve the
shortfalls in Social Security by creating more members, increasing the FICA tax
revenues, and enhancing state pension plans by sharing some of the burden in
paying out benefits with the federal Social Security system. 66 A federal man-
date, however, may be constitutionally suspect since it would, in effect, require
state employers to pay a tax to the federal government. 36 7 Furthermore, research
has shown that this may only extend the solvency of both Social Security and
state pension plans by a couple of years.
368
When state pension funds run out of money, retirees who are not under
Social Security will have no relief other than their own personal savings. 36 9 State
governments and their employees should seriously consider having their public
pension plans participate in the Social Security System as an additional protec-
tion against the economic risk of old age.
D. State Guarantee Against Default
The absence of any safeguards, particularly a safety net for public workers
in the event of plan failure, is a serious concern.3 70 In addition to (or in place of)
supplementing state pensions with federal Social Security benefits, states could
provide a guaranteed benefit for insolvent plans.
Private-sector plans pursuant to federal law have a guarantee via the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The corporation administers
bankrupt plans and pays workers their defined benefits up to a maximum based
on their age at retirement.37' Its underwriting and financial activity is funded in
part from insured plan sponsor premiums. 37
365. See Nuschler et al., supra note 19, at 7; Bipartisan Policy Center, Restoring Ameri-
ca's Future: Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Sim-
ple, Pro-Growth Tax System, THE DEBT REDUCTION TASK FORCE 19, 79 (2010),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/content/about-domenici-rivlin-debt-reduction-task
-force.
366. See Nuschler et al., supra note 19, at 7.
367. See id. at 18.
368. Id. at 7-8.
369. The level of voluntary savings is declining because more people are choosing to
maintain a relatively high standard of living during their pre-retirement years and
forego accumulated savings for old age. See ALLEN ET AL. supra note 16, at 7 (not-
ing that personal savings rates are "running at historically low levels").
370. We recognize there would be means-tested welfare benefits available.
371. The PBGC guarantees the payment of basic pension benefits either by becoming
the trustee of underfunded plans upon termination or by providing financial as-
sistance through loans (which are typically not repaid) in the event a pension fund
can no longer pay benefits when due at the guaranteed level (insolvency). Perfor-
mance and Accountability Report, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. 6, 10 (2005),
http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2oo5par.pdf [hereinafter 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE &
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Adopting a similar approach, the state sponsor could pay insurance premi-
ums per employee for each employee participating in the pension program.37 3
Like Social Security, such an alternative could pose a substantial strain on al-
ready budget-strapped states. To overcome this obstacle and defray costs, one
commentator urges states to consolidate plans, if legally and politically possi-
ble.37 4 In designing the program, moreover, states should take care to avoid the
serious funding problems that have plagued the PBGC.375 The PBGC has suf-
fered from years of adverse selection by plan sponsors that have engaged in
risky behavior, confident that the PBGC will provide insurance in the event of
plan failure.376 Nonetheless, proper incentives and control measures can be put
in place, such as the imposition of fiduciary standards or independent over-
sight.377 Another cause of PBGC weakness is corporate employers transitioning
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]. The PBGC separately operates single-employer and
multiemployer pension programs. The PBGC's obligations begin upon plan ter-
mination for single-employer pensions and upon insolvency for the multiemploy-
er pensions.
372. Id. at 11. Other funding comes from employer underfunding liability payments,
income earned on investments, and any assets taken over from failed plans. Id.;
see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 13o6-1307 (2012). The corporation receives no taxpayer mon-
ies and its statutory duties are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States Government. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra
note 371, at 3.
373. 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 371, at ii; accord
Mendales, supra note 260, at 539-43 (proposing to create state emergency funds
paralleling the federal PBGC to ensure payment of benefits during unexpected cri-
ses).
374. Mendales, supra note 260, at 543 ("[B]eing much larger, the state plans could ab-
sorb liabilities of this kind with comparatively minimal increases in employer and
employee contributions.").
375. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 330, at 5o8-16 (citing legal, economic, and sociologi-
cal reasons for the failing financial integrity of existing defined benefit plans and
of the federal pension insurance program that supports them).
376. A down-side risk of plan termination insurance is that government sponsors may
follow a riskier investment strategy. Brian A. Ciochetti et al., Determinants of Real
Estate Asset Allocations in Private and Public Pension Plans, 19 J. REAL ESTATE FIN.
ECON. 193 (1999) (positing that the PBGC guarantee encourages more risk taking
regarding pension investments by corporate sponsors). Private sector pensions
have been plagued with problems similar to the public sector pensions, where du-
bious accounting rules have allowed plan sponsors to avoid paying the full cost of
promised benefits.
377. As discussed supra at notes 261-270 and accompanying text, UMPERSA has fidu-
ciary standards that Wyoming, Maryland, and South Carolina have adopted. See
Unif. Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act §§ 7-11, 7A U.L.A.
347-55 (Supp. 1998); see also Willborn, supra note 260, at 141 (explaining that the
Act provides "a clear statement of the standard of fiduciary conduct" that "per-
mits and encourages public pension systems to engage in modern investment
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to defined contribution plans, 37 a switch that has likely been exacerbated by re-
forms raising employer premiums. 79
Like private employers, states also offer defined contribution plans to new
employees, including teachers. 38 However, unlike the private pension world,
the majority of public pension plans are defined benefit plans."' These pensions
have millions of members and hold millions of dollars in assets."2 Moreover,
rather than repeatedly raising premiums to support sustainability, a state
PBGC-type program may provide a lower benefit and higher age for retirement
eligibility compared to the federal program. 3 Ultimately, while the details of
any program would need to be thoroughly vetted under the particular circum-
stances of the state, insuring defined benefit pensions against default (albeit at a
reduced rate) would provide public employees some retirement security while
simultaneously allowing states considerable cost savings in the long-run.
practices"). Other suggestions for improved performance have targeted board
composition and structure. See Hess, supra note 253, at 216-20 (proposing to
change the composition of the governing boards of trustees of public pensions to
minimize political pressures).
378. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 330, at 513 ("[P]ension scholars have concluded that
the increasingly complex legislation and its attendant costs to business have de-
terred the establishment of defined benefit plans and/or fostered their termina-
tion."); Edward A. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 471-79 (explaining ERISA's role in
encouraging defined contribution pensions). Entire industries also imploded,
along with their pension plans, which left the PBGC with massive liabilities.
Anenson & Lahey, supra note 330, at 509 (explaining that much of the PBGC's ex-
ploding deficit is attributed to weaknesses in certain industries such as steel and
air transportation that account for almost three-quarters of past claims while rep-
resenting fewer than five percent of the insured participants).
379. Anenson & Lahey, supra note 330, at 527-30 (criticizing increase in employer in-
surance premiums imposed by the Pension Reform Act of 20o6); see also Zelinsky,
supra note 13, at 477 (explaining the premium payment structure of the PBGC
generates costs associated with defined benefit plans that do not exist with other
pension plans).
380. Lahey & Anenson, supra note 14, at 326-27.
381. William T. Payne & Stephen M. Pincus, The Constitutional Limitations of Public
Employee Pension Reform Legislation, 19 THE PUB. LAW. 12, 13 (2011) ("[D]efined
benefit plans still make up the bulk of the retirement plans in the public sector.");
Gordon Tiffany, Public Employee Retirement Planning, 28 EMP. BENEFITS J. 3, 7
(2003) (noting that ninety percent of public employee plans are defined benefit
plans).
382. Teachers' plans are almost universally defined benefit plans. Ronald Snell, State
Defined Contribution and Hybrid Pension Plans, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES 1 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/i/Documents/employ/
StateDC-%2oHybridRetirementPlans2olo.pdf.
383. See Anenson & Lahey, supra note 330, at 528 (suggesting PBGC reduce benefits and
raise age of benefit eligibility).
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Placing state pensions within the federal umbrella of PBGC protection
would not be easy or advisable.3s4 State assurance against plan insolvency would
eliminate the need for future federal aid, which would cause all taxpayers to
bear the burden.3s5 Moreover, bankruptcy is not a likely option for restructuring
state pension debt obligations. 3s6 In states facing emergency cost-cutting and
taxing situations, it may be necessary to accept federal assistance (if offered) in
the form of a low-interest loan or authorization to issue tax-subsidized
bonds.3s7 With many defined benefit plans on the brink of economic disaster,
states should study ways of providing plan termination insurance to bridge the
gap in coverage that would otherwise be filled by Social Security.
384. R. Eden Martin, Unfunded Public Pensions-The Next Quagmire, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SBlooo1424o527487o4o179o45754o981322366286o. Due to the number of plan fail-
ures and the failing financial health of major industries, the PBGC has an explod-
ing deficit and faces tremendous future exposure. 2004 Annual Report, PENSION
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. 10 (2005), http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2oo4
_annual-report.pdf; 2005 PBGC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra
note 371, at i; see also Anenson & Lahey, supra note 330, at 504-10 (analyzing the
fiscal distress of the PBGC and suggesting reforms). The federal government may
bail out the PBGC, which would move the state teacher pension burden from
state to federal taxpayers.
385. Martin, supra note 384 (advising that "[tihe next big issue on the national politi-
cal horizon" may be whether the federal government should bail out the many
states across the country with "overly generous and badly underfunded pension
plans"). See generally Terrance O'Reilly, A Public Pensions Bailout: Economics &
Law, 47 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM (forthcoming 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2368045 (suggesting how to implement any forthcoming federal aid).
386. See generally David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012)
(making a case for state bankruptcy). Federal bankruptcy is available to subdivi-
sions of state governments. See ElIman & Merrett, supra note 73, at 369 (focusing
on cities' rather than states' ability to use bankruptcy to solve their pension prob-
lems); Hylton, supra note 51, at 458-61 (providing city and county examples that
have restructured pension debt through bankruptcy).
387. Martin, supra note 384; see also Reinke, supra note 64, at 1675 (arguing that the
federal government could incentivize state governments to adopt minimum fund-
ing requirements by allowing them to issue tax-exempt bonds for the purpose of
funding the pensions of public employees). A common response for states at-
tempting to address failing pension funds is to issue bonds. Alaska and Illinois, for
example, issued bonds to fund their pension obligations. See PEW CHARITABLE TR.,
supra note 44. Underfunding will also adversely affect the investment ratings of
government bonds. See Daniel P. Mahoney, Toward a More Ethical System of State
and Local Government Retirement Funding, 14 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN.
MGMT. 197, 202 (2002). We previously cautioned governments against rolling the
dice by issuing more bonds to satisfy pension obligations. Lahey & Anenson, supra
note 14, at 321-22 (cautioning against the continued use of bonds as a stop-gap
measure that gambles on economic upswings or other uncertainties).
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In conclusion, the preceding discussion conducted a normative analysis of
possible pension reforms. No measure alone is a panacea, and many measures
will be subject to contentious political and legal debate. The main objective of
this Article has been to present alternatives and broaden the conversation about
public pension reform across disciplines. While it concentrated on one subcate-
gory of public pensions, educator defined benefit plans in non-Social Security
states, our analysis and recommendations have implications for pensions of all
public employees and, even more broadly, for government policies concerning
old-age security.
CONCLUSION
The public pension debt crisis jeopardizes the fiscal solvency of states and
the nation's long-term financial health. Retirement benefits are also a critical
component of income-maintenance for public retirees. The American public
certainly understands that we must live by our human capital. 3ss What we do
with the pensions of public school teachers will have a profound impact on the
retirement security of these important and often under-valued group of gov-
ernment workers.
While the education debate has been spotlighted teacher pensions, 38 9 the le-
gal literature on pension reform has largely ignored them. Using data from the
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, we provide a comprehensive
analysis of teacher defined benefit plans. We initially estimated the severity of
the public pension problem through statistical analyses and comparisons be-
tween plans that do and do not contribute to Social Security. We then evaluated
the legality and desirability of existing and proposed reforms.
Given the variation in plans among states and the legal and political envi-
ronments they operate in, we do not propose a single solution to this intractable
problem. Instead, we offer an array of options that should be considered when
assessing the present and future role of pensions as income maintenance for
public retirees and their beneficiaries. We additionally provide a paradigm for
considering changes to public plans.
Our proposals advocate items for immediate action as well as measures for
ongoing improvement. For the short-term, we unite legal and economic theory
in assessing the costs and benefits of possible reforms (including modifications
of existing plans and changes to plan structure). For the long-term, we suggest a
three-pronged model of measures targeting politicians, unions, and the public.
The framework is meant to facilitate decision-making by policymakers as they
tackle tough issues and difficult choices. Finally, in the thirteen states where
388. See Steven L. Paine & Andreas Schleicher, What the U.S. Can Learn from the
World's Most Successful Education Reform Efforts, McGRAw-HILL RESEARCH
FOUND. 5 (2011), http://www.mcgraw-hillresearchfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/pisa-intl-competitiveness.pdf.




teacher pensions systems do not contribute to Social Security, we strongly en-
courage government leaders to consider a safety net in the event of plan failure.
We suggest that states either supplement these plans with Social Security, or
create a state institutional safeguard similar to what the PBGC provides for pri-
vate pensions.
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APPENDIX
Table : Public Pension Plan Allocation39°
Panel A: Equities
NON-SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
YEARignForeignU.S. Equities Foreign U.S. Equities Equis
Equities Equities
2003 36.15% 11.26% 42.76% 13.89%
2004 37.36% 13.08% 44.07% 15.43%
2005 39.86% 14.96% 42.08% 15.59%
2006 42.26% 17.65% 40.78% 16.41%
2007 40.86% 18.94% 39.22% 16.66%
2008 32.55% 17.80% 32.32% 16.83%
2009 30.88% 18.49% 28.36% 16.04%
Average 37.13% 16.03% 38.51% 15.84%
Panel B: Bonds
NON-SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
YEAR
U.S. Bonds Foreign Bonds U.S. Bonds Foreign Bonds
2003 19.83% 1.62% 15.77% 1.36%
2004 17.86% 1.52% 13.770/0 1.45%
2005 17.44% 1.49% 13.23% 1.50%
2006 16.65% 1.47% 13.32% 1.11%
2007 15.18% 1.48% 12.48% 1.13%
20o8 16.98% 2.05% 14.07% 1.53%
2009 15.55% 1.90% 13.53% 1.55%
Average 17.07% t.65% 13.74% 1.38%




Panel C: Alternative Investments and Real Estate
NON-SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
YEAR Alternative Real Estate Alternative Real Estate
Investments Investments
2003 2.070/0 5.45% 1.91% 4.42%
2004 1.96% 5.26% 1.94% 4.34%
2005 2.16% 5.57% 2.34% 4.58%
2006 2.03% 6.94% 2.56% 5.24%
2007 3.52% 7.62% 3.07% 5.64%
2008 4.97% 8.94% 5.14% 6.79%
2009 4.73% 8.86% 6.33% 6.02%
Average 3.06% 6.95% 3.33% 5.29%
Panel D: Cash and Other
NON-SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
YEAR Cash and Other Assets Cash and Other Assets
Short Term Short Term
2003 2.68% 3.00% 3.12% 3.49%
2004 2.84% 3.25% 3.10% 2.96%
2005 2.14% 3.65% 2.52% 2.42%
2006 1.73% 3.90% 2.35% 2.89%
2007 1.69% 3.72% 2.94% 3.34%
2008 2.35% 5.22% 1.99% 4.18%
2009 2.71% 6.72% 2.51% 5.70%
Average 2.31% 4.21% 2.65% 3.57%
Panel E: Investment Returns
NON-SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY
YEAR One-year Standard One-year Standard
Investment Deviation Investment Deviation
Returns Returns
2003 5.55% 5.65384 6.38% 6.04475
2004 15.39% 2.74204 15.11% 2.94383
2005 10.39% 1.56769 10.30% 1.84733
2006 11.42% 3.09414 11.25% 2.57144
2007 17.49% 3.00598 16.85% 3.52448
2008 -4.93% 6.86027 -6.97% 6.71585
2009 -17.37% 10.92009 -13.56% 12.84398
Average 5.42% 4.83486 5.62% 5.21309
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Table 2: Membership in Defined Benefit Public Pension Plan9'
Panel A: Averages
ACTIVES RETIREES
YEAR Non-Social Social Non-Social Social









































INACTIVE VESTED ALL MEMBERS
YEAR Non-Social Social Non-Social Social
Security Security Security Security
2003 23,948.36 22,859.48 289,702.58 218,092.8o
2004 23,500.08 27,213.48 278,625.85 227,276.03
2005 25,966.55 23,894.59 300,298.92 227,369.69
2006 13,717.22 25,815.47 230,401.46 234,762.91
2007 29,298.91 27,193.91 318,011.17 239,638.03
2008 28,086.08 28,002.65 307,930.38 244,462.94
2009 31,721.18 28,615.79 333,863.25 247,429.86
Average 25,176.91 26,227.91 294,119.09 234,147.47






YEAR Non-Social Social Non-Social Social
Security Security Security Security
2003 2,130,290.00 4,622,554.00 854,475.00 1,979,930.00
2004 2,161,852.00 4,643,605.00 934,425.00 2,094,418.00
2005 2,180,002.00 4,668,002.00 921,420.00 2,182,349.00
2006 2,281,368.oo 4,771,829.00 983,881.oo 2,265,014.00
2007 2,265,992.00 4,81o,452.00 991,719.00 2,356,113.00
2008 2,364,599.00 4,844,446.00 1,056,o93.00 2,442,123.00
2009 2,336,533.00 4,840,392.00 1,o65,623.00 2,523,634.00
INACTIVE VESTED ALL MEMBERS
YEAR Non-Social Social Non-Social Social
Security Security Security Security
2003 263,432.00 754,363.00 3,476,431.00 7,633,248.00
2004 282,001.00 898,045.00 3,622,136.oo 7,954,661.oo
2005 285,632.00 812,416.oo 3,603,587.00 7,957,939.00
2006 164,6o6.6o 877,726.oo 2,995,219.00 8,216,702.00
2007 322,288.00 924,593.00 3,816,134.00 8,387,331.00
2008 337,033.00 952,090.00 4,003,095.00 8,556,203.00
2009 348,933.00 972,937.00 4,006,359.00 8,660,045.00
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Table 3: Employee and Employer Contribution Rates 92















































































































































Table 4: Funding Ratio93
FUNDED RATIO
YEAR

























Panel B: Non-Social Security States
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Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations for All Variables in the
Regression

























































































Employee Contr. Rates 4.82% 2.50%
Employer Rates 7.65% 3.44%
Equities 56.85% 9.61%
Bonds 26.98% 8.39%
One-Year Return 4.41% 12.32%
Actuarial Liability 36,793,027.66 36,929,745.03
Members 288,o6o.77 276,661.35
LogPopulation 6.53 .432
Table 6: OLS Regression Results for the Full Sample and Non-Social Security
Versus Social Security States
Panel A: All States
Unstandardized Beta Std. Error Standardized Beta
Uaal 50,o84,742.56 8,954,o85.52
S.S. or Non-S.S.** -2,931,998.84 995,195.59 -.167
Teachers* 26.017 8.53 .24
Salary** -91.927 41.36 -. 097
Employee Contr. Rates 127,523.02 139,045.44 .047
Employer Rates -10,976.913 91,355.09 -.006
Equities** -233,669.06 39,600.88 -.281
Bonds** -205,603.34 47,086.77 -.216
lyr Return 28,844.58 25,7o6.65 .8o8
Actuarial Liability** .178 .020 -.476
Members** -14.42 2.638 .047
LogPopulation** -3,916,186 1,216,688.47 -. 235
*Significant at .05
** Significant at .oi
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Panel B: Non-Social Security States
Unstandardized Beta Std. Error Standardized Beta
Uaal 43,054,163.55 22,427,877.61
S.S. or Non-S.S.**
Teachers* 31.041 14.248 .593
Salary** -231.969 74-504 -. 382
Employee Contr. Rates 298,526.43 353,884.03 .094
Employer Rates 62,853.66 157,722.83 .047
Equities** -1O6,351.03 120,468.38 -.149
Bonds*" -192,484.62 161,160.25 -.244
iyr Return -4,055.9 49,723.94 -.009
Actuarial Liability** .003 .066 .013
Members** -1.603 11.586 -.043
LogPopulation** 2,797,787.91 2,797,787.91 -.317
*Significant at .05
Significant at .oi
Panel C: Social Security States
Unstandardized Beta Std. Error Standardized Beta
Uaal 29,243,593.05 11,101,420.18
S.S. or Non-S.S.**
Teachers* -14.22 15.81 -.o84
Salary** -40.628 48.94 -.039
Employee Contr. Rates 42,827.06 149,844.63 .013
Employer Rates -27,127.62 1O8,664.65 -.011
Equities** -198,5o8.51 41,898.38 -. 234
Bonds** -201,244.187 49,463.27 -.207
iyr Return 27,520.35 29,o67.18 .042
Actuarial Liability* .252 .024 1.141
Members** -19.95 2.83 -.676
LogPopulation** -1,176,o1.69 1,598,002.79 -.o62
*Significant at .05
** Significant at ol
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